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BY KLAUS SEGBERS 
This working paper presents the results of my introductory lecture into global politics 
in the summer term of 2004 at Freie Universität Berlin. The organizing idea is to 
provide future students with some basic knowledge and tools for being prepared for 
future, similar lectures. 
 
The idea of this lecture is to give the students an overview of approaches and issues 
relevant for International Relations (IR). This is implemented in the following way. 
During the first hour, I present and explain relevant approaches to and issues of IR. 
Afterwards, for the second hour, the students disperse into groups and work on given 
questions related to the main topic, i. e. mostly to the theory discussed in that 
session. The respective theory has to be applied to a case, i.e. to a country or 
conflict. The countries / conflicts are stable within one group over the whole term. 
Finally, in the third hour, reports from the working groups are presented to the 
plenary session. 
 
This working paper aims at both – presenting the theories, and giving an idea of the 
work in the working groups. The following pages will offer brief sketches of the most 
relevant approaches to interpreting international relations / global politics. We start 
with looking into the two macro-approaches of social sciences, namely positivism and 
constructivism. Then we proceed to neo/ realism, institutionalism, world systems, 
liberalism / pluralism, and cognitivism. 
 
Afterwards, we present examples of the tasks, addressed by the students of my 
lecture in the summer term 2004. They had to apply those theories to their respective 
region and conflicts. 
 
The structure of the lectures differs somewhat from this outline and will be presented 
briefly. I start with the two meta-theories: positivism and constructvism. The IR 
theories are arranged re. their views on and from different levels of analysis. First 
come the global (or world) system theories (5th or system level perspective), followed 
INTRODUCTION 
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by institutionalism and regime theories (explaining 3rd (state) - and 4th (supro-state) 
level phenomena from a 3rd (state) image perspective). Next in line are realism and 
neo-realism, addressing 3rd level behavior from either a 1st (individual) or 5th level 
outlook. Then we have theories like two-level games and second image reversed 
explaining 3rd level outcomes from a 2nd (domestic) level. This is followed by pluralist, 
liberal and domestic structure approaches explaining state actions (3rd level) from a 
2nd level of analysis. Finally, there are cognitivist theories looking into 1st image 
factors such as mind sets for explaining IR.  
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 Meta-Theories 
 Positivism / Ratchoice Reflectivism / Constructivism 
World Systems Institutions  
Cognitive Approaches Substantial 
Theories of 
IR (Neo-) Realism Liberalism / domestic 
approaches 
 
 
 
POSITIVISM – CONSTRUCTIVISM/ META THEORIES 
 
Before we come to briefly presenting theories interpreting global politics, we have to 
make an important digression. We have to think about what we are doing here, and 
how we are doing it – making sense of global politics. This is related to very general 
and important questions related to social sciences. Two things have to be made 
clear. First, it is not possible to think about anything (at least in scientific terms) 
without making some very basic assumptions about how this will be organized. So 
the apparently attractive option sometimes heard in seminars “let’s do this without 
theories” is not workable. Even when these basic assumptions are not explicated, 
they are still there. We can’t do without them. And so it is better to make them direct 
and open. 
 
Second, theories are not something gruesome. There is no horror, no 
unsurmountable threshold involved. They are not really difficult to understand once 
you accept them as necessary and you start trying. And in science, we can’t do 
without them. Theories are not something scary but simply general assumptions 
about how factor a causes factor b. That is what science is about: explaining things. 
That sounds natural, but it is not. Many students assume that describing things is 
science, too. But even when we try to describe something we again cannot avoid 
using a guiding assumption as a roadmap (what data to look at, what cases to 
THE GAME OF THORIES 
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compare etc.). And secondly, most phenomena in social / political sciences are 
already available as data, and there is no need to re-collect them. But when they are 
not available, the endeavor to do that is way too big for a student’s thesis. 
 
The following pages are on how to use theories, and on what the most relevant 
theories are. For this purpose, it is useful to introduce a concept which helps to sort 
out different theories. This is the concept of levels of analysis (loa), which means: 
on what analytical level are we working when analyzing a given problem? It is 
obvious that when we are moving quickly back and forth from one level to another, 
we finally do not really know which is the most relevant one. So we first have to 
define a loa, and then stick to it until we formally may want to change it to another 
loa.  
 
There are different suggestions re. which, how many loas are required. This is what I 
propose (and will stick to):  
 
1st level:  individual actor/ agent / decision maker 
 
2nd level:  societal / social/ group/ transnational/ subnational actors  
(“domestic” sphere) 
 
3rd level:  unit / state/ government 
 
4th level:  supranational entities 
 
5th level:  global/ international system. 
 
These are 2 more levels than suggested by Kenneth Waltz in his influential 
introduction on “images” (levels) of IR analysis1. But I maintain that this is useful and 
legitimate. By the way: you see that we can be creative with theories. We can 
develop them. We may touch and modify them. 
 
Now before we move on to the theories, there is another concept that requires 
explanation (and then will be used in combination with the loas): variables. 
“Variables” is a term for groups of factors in “real life” that cause other factors, or are 
being caused by other factors. There are two basic types of variables: dependent 
variables (DV) – those factors being caused – and independent variables – the 
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causing factors (IV’s). There are more groups of factors in the literature on methods, 
but these two core groups will suffice here. 
 
Obviously, variables must be able to vary; if not, they cannot serve as variables. So 
we have to check in every instance when we define factors as variables if they have 
the potential to vary. Also, variables rarely can be observed directly. So we have to 
look at them on a somewhat more concrete level, namely that of indicators or 
proxies. There are many relevant indicators for IR questions for which we do have 
very good data, often in data banks and on the internet (demographic data, the 
Human Development Index, data on FDI, on conflicts and wars, on migration flows 
etc.). A good variable that cannot be operationalized with indicators is almost 
worthless. 
 
Once we have defined variables and know how to measure them, we are able to 
formulate a hypothesis; this is a statement re. how a given independent variable 
shapes the defined dependent variable. There should be as many hypotheses as 
IV’s2. Basically, a hypothesis is a less generalized, i.e. more concrete theory; or a 
theory applied to a precise case. 
 
Each of the IR theories to be described below can be classified by looking at its 
assumptions re. on which loa global politics phenomena take place, and from which 
loas they should be best explained. 
 
But before we address the so-called IR theories directly there is another step we 
should make, and this is on a meta-level of reasoning. It is not “clear” automatically 
how we are thinking, or how we should do that. Actually, there is a massive amount 
of literature exploring this field of how we “think”, and on how we interact with 
“reality”. These two terms are not self-explaining. Neurobiologists, evolutionary 
biologists, linguists, philosophers and other people in other disciplines have a 
fascinating, but also a hard time making “sense” of our way of “making sense”. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
1 Waltz, Kenneth: Man, the State and War, New York 1959. 
2 For more details on variables and theories, see van Evera, Stephen: Guide to Methods for Students 
of Political Science, Ithaka NY 1997, p. 7-49. 
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There are two basic ways of reasoning, and accordingly two main groups of 
researchers. This constitutes the important divide between the two big camps – 
positivists and constructivists. The decisive difference between them is how their 
representatives look at “reality”. While positivists maintain that reality does exist 
“outside” of their work (is exogenous), and that one can catch it by designing 
research procedures in a proper way (or at least that it makes sense to assume that 
we can do that), constructivists deny these assumptions or at least say that there is 
no evidence to assume the accessibility of reality. While this divide may seem quite 
academic – we all make reality assumptions or we could not act daily in our 
respective contexts – this academic debate on the nature of reality is very important 
indeed. And, most probably, it cannot be resolved in a convincing intersubjective 
way. So at the end of the day this is one point where you – we all – have to take a 
normative decision, i.e. a decision that in itself cannot be legitimized by science, but it 
rather is derived from plausibility, norms, and values. 
 
Positivists take the position that there are actors which have preferences and 
interests and that they act accordingly to achieve them. All these elements – actors, 
preferences and interests – can be described and analyzed. Also, how these actors 
act and shape events, and processes, can be tracked. There is an inbuilt tension 
between actors / agents and structures / institutions, but basically it is an interaction 
that can be handled productively.  
 
Constructivists deny most or all of this. They say that all preferences and interests 
are, or may be, fluent and shifting, and that they are all subject to changes during the 
process of social interaction and also of research. Therefore, one cannot take them 
for granted and certainly not as a starting point and a stable orientation for research. 
 
When we look at these metatheories from the position of loas, we can see that loas in 
themselves are basically an invention by positivists. Positivists can act from all of the 
above mentioned loas. Constructivists either would avoid framing research questions 
in loas, or they would say that their main loa is intersubjectivity – no matter where it 
occurs. 
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For this working paper on IR theories and their application, you will detect that there 
is NO principal decision on which of these two ways of thinking, and doing IR is 
“better”. This is something you have to decide by yourself. But there is a strong 
tendency, at least from my side, to accept positivist assumptions pragmatically for 
practical purposes. Using them will allow you to build meaningful and practical 
research designs (study proposals). Using them also will allow you to be prepared for 
most of the practical contexts of your professional positions you later will apply for, 
and work in.  
 
The core of many positivist, actor-oriented approaches is a rationality assumption. 
The methodical principle behind it is called rational choice. That means that actors 
do act rationally NOT in the sense of acting reasonably or “good”, but they act in a 
goal-oriented manner. The actions are input-rational, not necessarily out-put 
reasonable. The actors have the same pattern of doing things – by the way, in all 
spheres of life. They have fixed and mostly stable preferences (like survival, 
reproduction, resource accumulation, security/ protection, maybe cognitive 
consistency, see below) and act in a given situation to achieve their preferences. So 
they are utility maximizers (and still can be risk-prone or risk-averse). They screen 
the information at hand and then arrange the available options hierarchically, and act 
accordingly. While there certainly are limitations of information, of processing, of 
resource availability and of other constraints (like rules / institutions), the basic modus 
operandi is goal-oriented (a statement constructivists would attack). 
  
This principle is supposedly universal and across cultures, disciplines and activities. 
The economic success of a product, the political success of a political candidate and 
the international success of a state are all dependent on competition and on 
selections made by many individual actors: by consumers on the market, voters in 
elections, and by other states‘ behavior in conflicts. While the outcome may (and 
often will) differ from the intentions of most or even all those actors, the 
organizational principle of how they make their decisions, and that their 
preferences are their roadmap for action is relevant for analyzing and even predicting 
politics (and other social activities). 
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Positivists and rat-choice proponents are supposedly particularly effective in 
addressing decision theories (acting under / within constraints of a given situation), 
crisis behavior (Cuba, Berlin, 9/11 crises etc.), games (strategic action under 
constraints imposed by other actors / interdependent choices) and when taking up 
collective action problems. A sub-field of positivism / rat-choice is game theories.  
 
But this is not a statement on the eternal merits of positivism. We – and I – just 
don’t know. Constructivists are very strong in some important regards. First of 
all, they flatly make clear the inbuilt and quite often (though not here) hidden 
assumptions of positivist thinking. They can indicate and delegitimate the 
power potential of dominant positivist discourses. They can show that, and 
why, researchers are not neutral but active participants of discourse 
construction. They can demonstrate the crucial role of communication and 
texts for social sciences, politics, and IR. So this is definitely a very relevant 
method of reasoning (and questioning hegemonic ways of reasoning). They 
focus on topics like the role of social factors, norms and practices, and the 
importance of cultural aspects, habits and traditions. 
 
Post-positivists put forward relevant questions to positivists and rat-choice 
proponents: Do actors have sufficient information to make their choices? What 
exactly does „rational“ mean? Is there a universal definition of „utility“? Is the 
assumption of exogenously set preferences correct? How about acting in situations 
of uncertainty? What about shifting (unstable) interests / priorities, especially under 
the influence of communication? Are there no non-hierarchical, cooperative 
situations? Can they be achieved by communication? 
 
Constructivists also have an impressive record of thinking behind – or underneath – 
apparent “reason” and the dominant narrative of modernity. They came up with the 
first skeptical questions toward modernity after World War I, the next principal 
questions after World War II (“Dialectics of Enlightment”), they used the power-
deconstructing writings of Foucault, the text-deconstructions of Derrida and 
Baudrillard, and the discussions around risk-societies and new risks in these days of 
the early 21st century. Since we all are in a situation where modernity is attacked on 
different fronts – from religious fundamentalists of all sorts, from disoriented and 
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dislocated and discouraged social groups, and is discredited by ad-hocist policies, 
constructivists have to be aware of the potentials of their de-legitimizing potentials of 
their legitimate discourse critique. 
 
There are also tough questions for constructivists. Is there anything beyond the 
„subject“? Is there more than to ramble and to waffle? Are there any rules of 
discourse, any rule enforcement, anything beyond „anything goes“? What exactly can 
we do to explain ir / global politics applying these critical tools? 
 
To sum up, meta-theories propose more general assumptions about  
... the world and the nature of objects (ontology), 
... how we know that and what we know about this reality (epistemology), and 
... how to get (to) this knowledge (methodology). 
 
While positivists stand in the tradition of enlightenment, modernity and rationality, 
constructivists mostly would not deny the merits of these projects (or narratives) but 
rather focus on their limits, and on the dangers of exclusiveness. 
 
A brief dictionary for understanding meta-theories: 
Ontology:   A branch of science theory concerned with the nature and 
    relations of being, or things which exist. 
Epistemology:  A branch of science theory concerned with knowledge or  
ways of knowing, particularly in the context of the limits or 
 validity of the various ways of knowing. 
Hermeneutics:  The science of interpretation and explanation; exegesis.  
Heuristics:   Strategies of how to search for solutions. 
 
Historically, there were some so-called great debates in IR development. These 
debates served, and serve, as organizing principles for the relevant epistemological 
conflicts being addressed in and between university departments, research journals 
and, to some extent, the media.  
These debates, as they are mostly portrayed, were those between  
-- idealists / institutionalists and realists (since World War I), 
-- behaviorists / empiricists and hermeneutical approaches (since the 60s), 
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-- and then between all positivist and the others (de/constructivist, reflectivist, gender-
oriented) positions, creating “linguistic” and “cultural” turns. 
 
Now we will present five groups or IR theories that do generally follow positivist rules. 
They are mainly interested in the following questions: 
-- How are political decisions generated by actors? 
-- How do we explain political outcomes produced by these decisions? 
-- Under what circumstances is cooperation possible, and when and why does it fail? 
-- How do rules / institutions / regimes work? 
  13
REALISM/ NEO-REALISM 
 
There is no one single coherent definition of “realism.” There are at least two main 
brands: classical realism, and neo-realism. Classical realism was not very precise in 
defining its core assumptions. But a certain understanding of “man” –human beings –
, human nature, and of their eternal aspirations for power played a crucial role. This 
proposition looked increasingly odd, and in the 60s and 70s classical realism was 
sidelined. Apparently, more recent findings of evolutionary biology may lead to a 
renaissance of this concept, in combination with cognitive approaches (see below).  
 
Some 25 years ago, classical realism was mostly replaced by neo-realism. The 
original thinker behind neo-realism was Kenneth Waltz. Neo-realism was presented 
as an alternative to all other IR theories because it rested on “real” scientific 
assumptions. While this claim was and is questionable, neo-realism became quite 
influential. It rests on the assumption that states behave in the framework of the 
international system in the same way as producers and consumers do in economic 
markets. The “organizing” principle in both cases is, according to Waltz, anarchy, and 
the players behave accordingly. First of all they develop survival strategies. 
 
For a long time, international politics was defined and understood as politics between 
states. Accordingly, the discipline of IR required the existence and interaction of and 
between states. Consequently, reflections on the state are quite old: theories of the 
state, state-based law, etc. But we should note that clear definitions of “the” state 
always were not so easy to construct.  
 
The modern state was the core element of the so-called Westphalian system (1648-
1991), but it was preceded by the ancient Greek polis and other state-like entities. 
Attributes of states were the existence of an central administration, territoriality, 
internal sovereignty (esp. power monopoly), social homogenization, external 
sovereignty, citizenship/ Staatsbürgerschaft, national identity, borders (indicating 
distinct domestic/ foreign spheres), and specific state symbols. 
 
Loas: Realists were not quite specific here, but mostly they used the 1st level to 
explain outcomes on the 3rd level (2nd in Waltz’s terminology). Neorealists focus on 
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the 5th (in their parlance - 3rd) level, especially on anarchy, to explain system-level 
behavior (states, i.e. 3rd level in our terminology). 
 
Core ideas of realism are that the environment of states is anarchic and, in a way, 
dangerous. States are understood as unitary actors. Governments striving for 
survival had to follow the principle of self-help. This makes cooperation neither likely 
nor stable and, therefore, not reasonable. Another central realist assumption is that 
states are only interested in relative gains (compared to other rival states), not in 
absolute advantages.  
 
Core thinkers of classical realism were Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes. They 
were followed in the 20th century by Morgenthau, Schelling and others. Neo-realism 
is represented by authors like Waltz and Mearsheimer. 
 
A decisive difference between them is that classical realism rested mostly on 
assumptions re. the 1st level, and how that affected the 2nd (state) level, whereas 
neo-realism focuses on the 3rd level to explain the behavior of states on the 2nd 
level.  
 
Critique: Today, in global times, it is more problematic than ever to maintain that 
states are the only, or even the main players on the globe. Also, it seems that realists 
were not particularly successful in predicting – or even explaining - the end of the 
Cold War.  
 
Also, the unitary actor thesis is hardly “realistic”. Still, there are some interesting 
contributions from neo-realist thinkers. The prediction in the early 1990s that the 
bipolar Cold War system was more stable than the new (dis) order that replaced it 
has soe merit. 
 
Tasks for work grouping: 
1. Try to model your region / conflict first with a realist and then with a neo-realist 
approach. 
2. Why does anyone still engage in nation building if states are eroding? 
3. Are realists and neorealists normative? 
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INSTITUTIONALISM 
 
There is some confusion re. how to label this approach. Suggestions are: 
institutionalism, functionalism, idealism… Others talk about „neoliberal 
institutionalism. “ For our purpose here, I call this approach institutionalism. It is very 
close to regime theories.  
  
Definition: What is institutionalism about? This approach wants to explain 
cooperation between (state) actors and coordination of their actions. It also 
addresses the core question of in/stability and in/security. Institutionalists maintain 
that cooperation between states / governments is possible and may be effective. 
 
Loa: Institutionalists try to explain 3rd level performances from a 3rd or 4th level 
perspective. 
 
Core ideas: It probably makes sense to start with a look at institutions in general. 
What are they? Institutions can be best understood as rules of the game. They may 
be formal or informal, legal or illegal, effective or not. Rules labeled as institutions are 
constraints – and opportunities – for actors. They should not be confused with 
organizations. 
 
Institutions are formal and informal rules that constrain individual behavior and shape 
human interaction (Douglass North). 
 
The concept of institutions was developed by economists and constituted the 
approach of neo-institutionalism. Increasingly, it is applied by political scientists as 
well. Related terms and concepts are transaction costs, principal-agent relations, 
institutional change, path dependency and regimes.  
 
Regimes are the institutions of IR. They are sets of implicit or explicit principles, 
norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors‘ expectations 
converge in a given area of international relations (Stephen Krasner). 
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Basic assumptions of institutionalist thinkers for international relations are the 
following. Institutionalists have a similar understanding of the international system 
(anarchic) and the state (unitary) as realists. But they are saying that the state can be 
embedded in rules and act in such a way that its inherent behavior – utility 
maximizing strategies leading to permanent instability for everyone (security 
dilemma) – can be overcome by utility maximizing – leading to increasing 
interdependence b/w states, thereby producing stability and cooperation. A 
compatible way of reasoning is that states accept rules / regimes even in those cases 
when their short-term effects are detrimental for them because (only) this guarantees 
that other participants also will accept these rules in the future. So the potential 
negative future impact of defection today - the so-called shadow of the future – 
ensures rule acceptance now.  
 
Institutionalists realize that modern societies are characterized by complex schemes 
of division of labor. This makes them vulnerable for dysfunctions, for example by 
attacks. So governments may develop an interest in intertwining and integrating 
some of their functional spheres with other societies – resulting in networks, and in 
increasing mutual vulnerability.  
 
These kind of functional approaches are not necessarily idealistic (an early 20th 
century term for the assumptions that wars can be avoided by international 
institutions). It is especially worthwhile to note that we do not need to call for altruistic 
principles, but rather expect common interests because there are common 
institutions and regimes leading to reduced TACs and making defections difficult.  
 
So regimes and institutions can be useful, according to their proponents, because 
they do not rest on appeals and values, but because they rather serve mutual 
interests. Therefore, they can be integrated into interests, or even preferences, of 
state actors – who expect utilities from regimes. 
 
Basic thinkers/ proponents: The economist and Nobel laureate Douglass North is 
the most influential thinker on institutions. But there is a whole school of neo-
institutionalists. Stephen Krasner coined the leading definition for IR regimes.   
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Critique: Institutionalists have problems in explaining the breakdown of institutions, 
or their ineffectiveness. When observing rules is such a convincing concept, why is 
there not more rule-observance in global politics? 
 
Tasks for work grouping:   
1. What relevant institutions can you detect in your region? In what policy fields? 
2. Do international laws and regimes constrain (or enable) the behavior of 
actors? How? 
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THIRD (FIFTH) IMAGE APPROACHES 
 
There are at least nine different approaches explaining processes and events on 
levels 1 to 3/5 (1 to x) with third image causation. There are more or less Marxist 
theories, like Imperialism (Lenin), social hegemony (Gramsci), world systems 
theories (Immanuel Wallerstein), and the critical theory of world orders (Robert Cox). 
 
Then we do have non-Marxist approaches which belong into the 5th level group, 
namely international Political Economy (IPE, Susan Strange et al.), neo-realism 
(Kenneth Waltz and others), some globalization theories, some global culture 
theories (Samuel Huntington), and some game theories that can be applied to IR.  
 
Loa: All these approaches look from a 5th level (formerly 3rd level) to explain 
outcomes on other levels.  
 
These approaches differ significantly in their relevance today. Not all of them can be 
explained here. Globalization is one of the currently most important fields of analysis, 
IPE as well. Neo-Realism was addressed in connection with Realism. Civilization has 
to be dealt with in the culture session. Imperialism is „out. “ 
Gramcianism is not of much relevance today in IR. 
 
Core ideas: There are some central ideas more or less common to most 3rd level 
approaches. Obviously, the relevant level of analysis is the 3rd level. For most of 
these theories, the world system is primarily characterized by global capitalism. The 
world system is, so to say, the playground of world capitalism, and is being shaped 
and structured by world capitalism. Because of the inherent dynamics of wc, the ws is 
„injust“. It is heterogeneous, and the decisive marker is the capability of actors / 
states to belong to the „core. “ 
 
There is a social dimension of interaction. Relations between social groups are as – 
or even more – important, as diplomatic relations between states and governments. 
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One important theoretical source of many 3rd level approaches is Marxism. This 
started with the critique of imperialism and was further developed into Leninism. 
These theoretical currents were more / or less popular (at different times?) depending 
on crisis situations. Antonio Gramsci‘s concept of hegemony was a quite 
sophisticated attempt to adapt Marxism to the conditions in the middle decades of the 
20th century. He included the concept of culture into his thinking.  
 
Another influential theoretical background came from history, particularly from the 
French group around the journal “Annales”. The historical Annales school was 
focusing not on individuals, emperors, or single events, but suggesting a multiple 
time model: the longue duree, medium term time frames (conjunctures) and events.  
 
Core thinkers: These are primarily Immanuel Wallerstein and Robert Cox. 
Wallerstein is probably the most influential thinker in the group of 3rd level 
approaches to IR. He developed a concept called the world system approach. This is 
an all-encompassing idea operating on the level of world empires and world 
economies. The world system we are living in is determined by the global economy, 
namely: the capitalist economy. This global capitalist economy produces three 
different, but also interrelated spaces: cores, peripheries, and semi-peripheries.  
 
Core members are characterized by democratic governments, relatively high wages, 
the import of resources, the export of manufactured goods, and efficient welfare 
services. Periphery members are characterized by the absence of these qualities. 
Semi-periphery regions are an intermediate space between the two others. A central 
question here is, of course, if and how a political entity can “migrate” from one group 
to another.  
 
In addition to this spatial organization, there is also a temporal dimension of world 
systems such as cycles, trends, waves, crises etc. The role of states in this system is 
important. 
 
Robert Cox is another good example for interesting 3rd level approaches.  
He is quite reflective on theorizing: He discriminates between problem-solving 
theories, and critical theories. 
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The basic analytical category for Cox is historical structures. This term is defined as a 
„framework for action”, as a „particular configuration of forces”. In any given historical 
structure, writes Cox, there are three categories of forces which interact: Ideas, 
institutions, and material capabilities3. Theses social structures are „located“ or 
operative on („applied to“) three different levels: Social forces, states and world 
orders4. This concept developed by Cox is quite productive. He demonstrates what 
can be done with 3rd level thinking. 
 
The most dominant approaches today are related to globalization as a process. The 
reduction of the meaning of borders, the changes on the regulatory capabilities of 
governments and states, the increasing importance of flows and scapes, ongoing 
ways of compression of time and space, digitalization and many other variables and 
phenomena have certainly a major impact on global politics. There are too many 
authors and writings on this subject to enumerate them here. For more details and 
analysis, I siggest to turn to the papers and books written by Appadurai, Castells, 
McGrew and Scholte, among others. 
 
Critique: Wallerstein has problems predicting if, and under what conditions states 
may move up-or downwards in his hierarchy. Cox shows implicitly that “adequate” 
theories are exposed to the danger of “overcomplexity.”  
 
Tasks for work grouping: 
Please apply Wallerstein, Cox or Game theory to your region/ conflict.  
1. What is “core,” what is – “periphery?” How can a unit move upward / 
downward? 
2. What are the historical structures that frame the playground for the relevant 
actors? 
                                                          
3 Cox, Robert W.: Social Forces, States and World Orders. Beyond the International Relations Theory, 
in: Keohane, Robert O.: Neorealism and its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press 1986, p.218. 
4 ibid., p.221. 
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THE LIBERAL/ PLURALISTIC AND DOMESTIC STRUCTURE 
APPROACHES 
 
The analytical focus of liberalism / pluralism shifts toward domestic structures and 
actors: What is their impact on state behavior? What is their own transnational role? 
 
In this case, the dependent variables are, still, aspects of international or world 
politics. But the domestic context (structures) will be brought in as independent 
variables.  
 
Loas: All these approaches start at the 2nd (domestic / societal) level to explain 
causal effects on the 3rd (state) and 4th levels.  
 
This is different from explaining domestic events / processes with international factors 
(like globalization). And this is different, too, from explaining state behavior by 
system-level qualities (anarchy; distribution of capabilities / information). 
 
Liberalism 
Liberalism is not just one concept. It has broad implications and many different 
meanings. Liberalism in economics is different from political liberalism in the U.S. 
also, liberal parties are quite different (see Germany, Austria and Russia).  
 
In an IR context, liberalism means that democratic states don‘t fight each other – this 
is the theory of democratic peace. But note: democracies do fight non-democracies. 
 
The basic tenet of liberal approaches in IR is that „state-society relations - the 
relationship of states to the domestic and transnational social context in which they 
are embedded - have a fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics“ 
(Andrew Moravcsik). 
 
There are important implications to draw from this kind of reasoning. This approach is 
not compatible with states as „black boxes,“ states as effective resource mobilizers, 
states as “containers,” states as unitary actors, states as rational decision makers 
(though it may be compatible with rat. choice). 
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Other implications are that societies and social actors are the relevant level / object of 
analysis. They act and interact, they build coalitions, they lobby, they put pressure on 
bureaucracies, they act – collectively or individually. 
This is what being „liberal“ or „plural“ means in this IR context. 
 
Core assumptions: There is a primacy of societal actors, of individuals and social 
groups. Political actors are dependent on election cycles (and, in general, on time). 
The proper definition of their interests is central. 
 
„States ... are not (unitary) actor(s) but representative institution(s) constantly subject 
to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social 
actors.“ (Moravcsik 1997, 518) 
   
Ideational liberalism 
This approach is about the role of ideas and ideologies. It looks at societal 
preferences concerning the scope and content of a „nation. “It is interested in the 
commitment of individuals and social groups to particular ideas and political 
institutions (regime types).  
 
Commercial liberalism 
This approach is about the relevance of patterns of market incentives for domestic 
and transnational economic actors. The matter here is not only free trade. The 
underlying thesis is more general: The greater the economic benefits for private 
actors, the greater their incentive to press governments to facilitate such 
transactions. 
 
Republican liberalism 
This interpretation addresses the mode of domestic political representation which 
determines whose social preferences are institutionally privileged. Rent-seeking is an 
important mode of action in this framework.  
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Two-level games 
Another important school in this field is the two-level games, presented by Robert 
Putnam. This theory suggests a close linkage between international negotiations and 
domestic support. Whatever the results on the international “table” (level 1) between 
two different teams (representing two states) are, they will be accepted and become 
operational only after they have been “ratified” in the respective countries by 
domestic procedures (level 2). An important concept here is that of winsets, 
indicating the sum of all possible results at table1.   
 
Transnationalism 
This concept perceives social actors as transnational (non-state) actors and players 
on the world politics arena. Their prospects to intrude other societies depend on 
those societies and their domestic structures. 
 
Domestic actors have a „primacy.“ They act in a way that is goal-oriented, risk-averse 
and rational. Politics (including external) is the result of domestic bargaining. The 
basic social actors are relatively autonomous. 
States and governments are not independent entities and actors, but representatives 
of different and particular interests. Those sub-state - interests aim at power and 
resources, via coalition building, elections and the media. 
 
Critique: While generally quite plausible and strong in explanatory power, “liberal” 
approaches require research strategies which are complex. They may require case 
studies, and they are necessarily comparative.  
You never succeed in identifying a domestic structure / coalition once and forever – 
they are permanently shifting. 
 
Work group tasks: 
1. What domestic structures are decisive for your region / conflict? 
2. If you analyze the recent events in your region - is there anything which 
cannot be explained by domestic structures, constellations, interests? 
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COGNITIVE APPROACHES 
 
This IR-theory is located at the first level of analysis. It may be said that it suggests a 
homo psychologicus. 
 
What are cognitive approaches? They are „reflexive“, they „consider the role of 
policymakers‘ beliefs and images,“ and they challenge „much of Western thought and 
practice premised on the assumption of individual rationality“ (Rosati). 
 
Given the media landscape as it is now, individual decision makers are often seen, or 
portrayed, as the central movers of politics. In that case, problematic personal 
histories may cause huge havoc in IR. The apparent presence of these cases and 
examples and their permanent availability makes alleged idiosyncrasies of decision-
makers easy prey for the media.  
 
Why are cognitive approaches needed or popular? The performance, and the 
behavior, of decision maker’s, governments, bureaucrats etc. often seem difficult to 
explain in rational (goal-oriented) terms. The more complex an environment, or a 
task, or a challenge, the less „hard“ and reliable the facts and data.  
Under strict time constraints, „psychological factors“ seem to gain in importance. 
 
Basic assumptions of this approach are: Politicians act because of a specific social, 
ethnical, or cultural background. Politicians are, at least sometimes, characterized by 
(religious, ideological, other) obsessions. Or even, in some cases, politicians are 
„crazy“ and act irresponsibly. 
 
Guiding questions of this approach: How do decision-makers view the world? What 
shapes their convictions and world views? But, first of all: What is the effect of 
decision-makers’ perceptions and world views on IR/ WP? 
 
Basic assumptions: The „subjective factor“ in decision-makers’ reasoning is so 
dominant that it shapes their political actions. Other shaping factors are embedded 
into mindsets. Consequently, their actions cannot be explained by positivist 
approaches. 
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Cognitive approaches are interested in (seemingly) non-rational factors related to the 
mindsets of decision makers: particularities like world views, beliefs, specific 
decision-making habits and stress-coping potentials 
 
Subgroups. Important directions for research in the framework of cognitive 
approaches are works related to images of the enemy / mirror images; the role of 
national stereotypes; the role of public opinion; and the role of perceptions and 
misperceptions. We will not describe these interpretations here in detail. 
 
Operational codes: The concept of cognitive consistency is an overall coherent set 
of beliefs about the nature of political life. Among them, there are philosophical 
beliefs (on historical cycles, on the character of human nature etc.), and instrumental 
beliefs, related to strategies and tactic (risk-taking, etc.). 
 
Cognitive mapping: This approach is related to specific beliefs, and their 
interconnectedness, in decision-makers’ minds. It tries to represent a person‘s 
assertions about something, and it maintains there are stages – cognitive steps – of 
politicians‘ mental procedures. 
 
Attribution (explanation) theory: This theory addresses attribution errors and 
biases. It tries to explain individual behavior with external / situational causes. It 
furthermore assumes strategies like accepting successes for oneself, blaming others 
for problems. 
 
Social cognition and schemata theories: The basic assumption of this theory is 
that people do not like to change, once they have established beliefs / patterns. They 
screen their environment, and perceive data through their existing lenses. This is 
especially true in complex and unstable situations, and during informational overflow. 
The preferred strategy in such cases is Reductionism. 
 
Some findings and results: It seems that there are strong indications that the 
organizational principle of cognitive consistency is important: „...individuals make 
  26
sense of the world by relying on key beliefs and strive to maintain consistency 
between their beliefs5.“ 
 
It also has been established that decision-makers try avoid (new) information not 
compatible with established assumptions / views and, therefore, requiring re-thinking. 
This makes common-sense assumptions such as „more information and proper 
consulting improve politics“ questionable. 
 
Some research results imply that the effects of impacts, information, and propaganda 
are quite diverse, and strongly depend on contexts / environments.  
Positive emotions toward „messengers“ and the personal surroundings are important. 
„Incoming information ... gets interpreted in accordance with an individual‘s existing 
central beliefs and predispositions.“ (Rosati) 
  
Perceptions, patterns, idiosyncrasies, habits, exiting maps etc. are of utmost 
importance for the functioning of dm‘s, and for hb‘s in general. 
 
Critique: New results from brain and neurological research imply that the reliability of 
our perceptions and memories is highly questionable. Similar problems with accuracy 
– itself a problematic concept – occur with our memories. Another crucial problem is 
operationalization. How can we reliably “open up the brains” of politicians and other 
actors to track their procedures? 
 
Questions for work-grouping: 
1. Look for obvious examples of dm’s decisions that only may be explained by their 
    beliefs, operational codes etc.  
2. Name some typical belief systems of decision makers in your region.  
    How – if at all - could learning be initiated? 
3. Imagine you are a newly appointed foreign minister.  
    What would you do to avoid cognitive traps? 
 
 
                                                          
5 Rosati, Jerel A.: A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy, in: Rosati, Jerel A. / Hagan, 
Joe D. / Sampson, Martin W. III (eds.): Foreign Policy Restructuring - How Governments Respond to 
Global Change. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press 1994, p. 52. 
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BY PETER DYLLICK-BRENZINGER AND CHRISTOF MAUERSBERGER 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ISRAELI-PALASTINIAN CONFLICT6, 
FOLLOWING WALTZ’ LEVELS OF ANALYSIS7.  
 
 
The conflict between Israelis (originally 
Zionists) and Palestinians over the land 
between the Jordan River and the 
Mediterranean Sea dates back to the 
early 20th century. Given this long history 
of the present dispute, a comprehensive 
introduction would provide enough 
material to fill book after book (some of 
those who have already been written can 
be found in the appendix). The task of our 
work group was to apply various theories 
of international relations to the conflict. 
Since these theories can easily be 
categorized by their level of analysis, the  
 
following introduction will sketch out the most important actors on the three levels 
defined by Kenneth Waltz. 
Here, only the actors relevant in the discussions of our workgroup will be introduced. 
 
An important question that has to be discussed first is whether Palestine can be seen 
as a state or not. This is crucial, since most of the theories of international relations 
are actually theories of relations among states. Palestine is certainly not a state in a 
narrow sense. It has neither its own territory nor is it sovereign. However, it is still 
useful to work with the assumption that Palestine is a state for several reasons. The 
Palestinians are, at least partly, autonomous from Israel following the Oslo I (1993) 
                                                          
6 The information given here describes the situation as of summer 2004. Although the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is changing constantly, certain general patterns remain much the same. Especially 
the relations of actors and the structures on the various levels of analysis change slowly. This makes 
this introduction worth reading, even after a landmark event such as Arafat’s death. 
7 Waltz, Kennetz: Man, the State and War. A Theoretical Analysis, New York 1959 
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT
Source: Central Intelligence Agency,  
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/israel_pol01.jpg 
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and II (1995) agreements. These treaties led to the establishment of the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) which ever since has represented and governed the Palestinian 
people living in Gaza and the West Bank. The PA is also negotiating with Israel eye 
to eye. This diplomatic practice seems to be the most important argument for taking 
Palestine as a state. Another one seems to be somewhat tautological: Most of the 
theories that we applied, and which do require states as actors, did produce sensible 
results. Considering Palestine as a state is therefore useful, but one should keep in 
mind that it is no more than an assumption: Palestine is not, at least for now, a proper 
state. 
The international level, or third image, takes a look at the global context. This level 
can be divided into sub-groups: relevant third-party states, transnational actors and 
international organization; the relations between states; and the so called world 
system. The relevant states and other transnational actors are mainly those involved 
in the peace efforts (USA, Russia, Egypt, EU, UN and the Arab League) and those 
who are at least supposed to support Palestinian terrorism (Iran and Syria). 
Looking at the relevant relations between states, the most important one seems to be 
between Israel and the USA. Looking back on a long history of support, the USA 
stands firmly with Israel. A comparable partner, either by power or strength of 
support, cannot be found on the side of the Palestinians. The EU, and especially 
France as one of its most important members, seem to be strong supporters of the 
Palestinians. The Arab nations, however, are not as strongly on the Palestinian side 
as one might expect. Both Israelis and Palestinians consider themselves isolated 
from the rest of the world and as victims of the respective other side. 
From a systemic perspective, referring to the constellation of power, it is obvious that 
Israel is much closer to the center, while the Palestinians are closer to the periphery. 
Israel’s military power and economic strength make it a natural regional center, 
although it is relatively isolated from its surroundings. The Palestinians in contrast do 
not have any military power, lack natural resources and are economically 
underdeveloped. 
 
Most theories try to tackle international relations on the second or state level. The 
various approaches however use different perspectives on the state. Sub-national 
actors are at the focus of the liberal theories, the political system is the key for 
institutionalism and political culture and society play an important role in constructivist 
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approaches.  
Who are the sub-national actors relevant to the conflict? The workgroup focused on 
the two major Israeli parties, Likud and Labor, the settlers’ council and the peace 
movement for Israel. On the Palestinian side, we focused on the Fatah, the 
Palestinian Authority (PA), Hamas, and the Islamic Djihad as the most influential 
domestic actors. With regard to the political system, there is a clear difference 
between the two sides. Israel is a parliamentary democracy, which is marked by a 
wide variety of parties represented in the Knesset (parliament). This produces 
coalitions including several different parties, which in turn lead to unstable 
governments. The high frequency of national elections and coalition re-building is an 
excellent indicator for this instability. Although the PA, i.e. the ruling body for the 
Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, is supposed to be democratic, under the 
reign of Yassir Arafat it resembled a typical authoritarian regime. Given this structure, 
the PA government is highly stable. However, militant groups like Hamas or Islamic 
Djihad pose a credible threat to the rule of the established government from outside 
of the institutional setting. 
From a social and cultural perspective, Israel and Palestine are just as different. The 
society of Israel is highly fragmented due to the varying origins of its citizens. Zionism 
and Judaism, as uniting ideologies, loose their importance as a result of the effects of 
the post-industrial era. The high number of Russian immigrants, who came to Israel 
mainly for financial reasons, increases this problem even further. On top of that, the 
Israeli government implemented harsh social reforms in the last years which 
increased social inequality. Economically, Israel is well positioned on the world 
market with leading companies in arms, information technology and biotech. 
However, the second intifada (starting in September 2000) did hurt this position. The 
Palestinian society is much less diversified than Israel’s. It is, in spite of its difficult 
position, highly educated, yet the economical basis is still mainly agricultural, which is 
also a result of the occupation. The curfews, an everyday reality during the second 
intifada, hurt the Palestinian immensely. The hardships of the intensified occupation 
led to an increase in the importance of religion, i.e. Islam. 
 
The first level looks at individuals who are relevant for international relations. On the 
Israeli side, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is the most influential figure in the conflict, 
since he has the last word on all decisions. On the Palestinian side, Yassir Arafat has 
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an even stronger position (as of summer 2004). He is not only chairman of Fatah and 
the PLO, but most importantly President of the PA (Palestinian Authority). In contrast 
to Sharon, he does not need to fear defeat in elections. Another relevant figure for 
the Palestinians is Sheikh Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas. Given the 
importance of his party (or rather movement), he has a high moral standing and the 
power to influence public opinion and therefore politics by using this public opinion 
and by directing violence (i.e. suicide bombings). On the regional level, the most 
important individual is Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt. Egypt was the first Arab 
country accepting Israel as a state, Mubarak himself pushed for a ceasefire on 
several occasions. Since he is respected by both sides, he plays a vital role in most 
negotiating efforts. From an international perspective, given the military, financial and 
political power of their nation, the most important person is certainly the President of 
the United States of America, Bill Clinton until January 2001 followed by George W. 
Bush. 
 
Although this introduction is not only a snapshot of the situation of summer 2004, but 
also overtly brief, it should have made clear how different the two sides of the conflict 
are. For more information, we would like to suggest the following sources: 
 
Web Resources: 
http://www.haaretz.com  
Online version of the English translation of Israel’s number one quality 
newspaper. Very up to date. 
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/meast/archive/  
Archive of CNN’s Middle East coverage. 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14380  
Very interesting article on the negotiations at Camp David 2000, written by co-
negotiators. 
http://www.merip.org/  
Website of the “Middle East Research and Information Project” - a think tank with 
a clear focus on the conflict. Excellent background essays. 
http://www.btselem.org/  
The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. 
Good source to get an impression of the situation in the territories. 
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http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/mideast.htm  
A collection of all relevant legal documents relevant for the conflict (UN 
Resolutions, Treaties, etc.). 
http://www.memri.de  
Middle East Media Research Institute: Offers a newsletter in German/English 
with translated articles from mostly Arab media (newspapers). 
http://www.world-newspapers.com/palestine.html and http://www.palestine-
net.com/news/ 
Two lists of Palestinian (online) newspapers. 
 
 
INSTITUTIONALISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT 
 
There are several regimes or institutions, formal and informal, relevant to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict8. We focused our discussion on the Roadmap, as an international 
regime dealing with our conflict. The "Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent 
Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Crisis" had been presented on 
September 17, 2002 by the middle-east quartet (including the USA, Russia, the UN 
and the EU). It put down three stages for achieving peace on the basis of a two-state 
solution. On the first stage, the Palestinians had to stop terrorism, reform the 
Palestinian Authority and hold elections, while the Israelis were to withdraw troops 
and freeze the building of settlements. On a second stage, a Palestinian state should 
have been founded, while an international peace conference should have been 
staged and international monitoring of compliance with the Roadmap should have 
been put into place. On the third and final stage, a final peace treaty should have 
been signed, solving the most explosive questions, such as the status of Jerusalem, 
the refugees and the settlements. As one might already know, stages two and three 
were never implemented and even the low-key stage one failed over time. However, 
looking back at this attempt seemed to us a good example for regime theory. The 
fundamental question our workgroup discussed was whether the Roadmap enabled 
or restricted the behavior of the parties involved. 
                                                          
8 Very important regimes for the two societies are certainly the Torah and the Koran, having a huge 
impact on the lives of the people. We decided against discussing this further, because those two 
regimes act primarily on their respective side and are not regimes mutually agreed upon by both 
parties. 
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First of all, we tried to grasp the features of the Roadmap making it an international 
regime. Every regime consists of a set of principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures, and so does the Roadmap. Its principles are peace and security 
as the highest values, but also sovereignty of the people. The Roadmap furthermore 
sets non-violence, democracy and transparency as its norms. The rules of the regime 
are seen in the agreement to finally end terror, occupation and the building of 
settlements and to reform the Palestinian Authority. A decision-making procedure 
was designed and implemented by the middle-east quartet, i.e. USA, EU, Russia and 
the UN. Besides all these features, the Roadmap is neither an actor by itself nor has 
it an organizational body. So it does fulfil the criteria of a regime perfectly. 
According to regime theory, the behaviour of the actors should converge around 
this setting. Consequently the question to be answered is about the Roadmap’s 
impact on this conflict and how it worked. The most important aspect to any 
(successful) regime is the reduction of transaction costs for both parties. The 
Roadmap set common goals, defined the actors participating in the process and the 
decision-making procedures and freed the delegations to a great extent from 
discussing these matters over and over again. But still, critics argued that exactly 
those matters were not defined very precisely. For example, the first stage did not 
foresee a monitoring of compliance. However, the Roadmap supplied the two sides 
with information and therefore increased the willingness to cooperate, which is 
probably the most important aspect of this regime. It clearly defined cooperation and 
defection and hence stabilized expectations of both sides. Additionally, the pay-off-
matrix was altered through this definition by increasing the costs of defection. This 
was the case, because both parties feared a loss of reputation, being 
disadvantageous in the upcoming negotiations and in talks on financial aid, being 
vital to both sides. The three stages laid out by the regime is a means to overcome 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma by including the “shadow of the future”. This means bringing 
the iterating character of the “game” to the attention of the actors and in doing so 
making cooperation the most efficient strategy of both parties. That is the reason why 
this regime was created and why it was useful. 
 
Naturally, a discussion emerged whether the Roadmap was a “dead letter regime”. 
Given the failure, it is an easy question to answer. Still, some steps on both sides 
have been taken. For example the office of a Palestinian prime minister was created, 
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thus giving Israel the opportunity to hold high-level talks with the Palestinians after 
the Sharon administration declared Arafat a “persona non grata”. Besides, a 
temporary unilateral truce by the Palestinians had been put into place and Israel did 
demolish some illegal settlement outposts in the context of the Roadmap. In the end, 
however, actual peace negotiations never took place, nor did the violence end. This 
might all be due to the noncommittal manner in which the Roadmap was written, 
since only the smallest common denominator seemed agreeable. Nevertheless, the 
effects discussed above are still relevant and true, even if only to a smaller extent. 
The best answer to all pessimism is still the counter-question: What would be the 
consequences if the regime would not have been put in place? Would it not have 
been even worse? 
Analyzing only the Roadmap is not sufficient to conclude whether regimes play a 
decisive role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As noted above there are various 
relevant regimes, formal and informal, both deepening and softening the conflict. It is 
important to point out that the introduction of formal institutions always brings about 
the replacement of informal ones. The failure of the road map might be read as a 
failure to replace certain informal institutions. So the reason why the Roadmap failed 
is not inherent in the concept of a regime, but rather evidence for a poor design. All 
the weaknesses are arguments to further develop measures increasing the will to 
cooperate rather than abolish regimes as such. A properly designed regime can 
enable and restrict the behaviour of conflicting parties and hence further the cause of 
peace.  
 
 
FROM DOVE TO HAWK – CHANGES EXPLAINED 
   Domestic Structures/Liberalism 
 
Theories of international relations that take state preferences as exogenously given 
often struggle to explain changes in foreign policy. By opening the „black box“ state 
and examining the domestic structures, liberal approaches are useful for 
understanding policy turns that are usually hard to grasp with third image rational 
choice models. To illustrate this advantage, our workgroup applied this theory to two 
questions: Why did the Palestinian leadership, i.e. Arafat, decide to support terrorism 
after the second Intifada started although he opposed it in the beginning? And why 
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did the Israelis decide to re-occupy territory during the second Intifada, although they 
had withdrawn from it years earlier? It is important to note that examining domestic 
structures is a very complex endeavor. The relevant actors and the configuration of 
power are constantly shifting, and hence using this approach makes a broad 
empirical basis necessary. Needless to say that our workgroup did not fulfill this 
requirement, although some preparatory efforts were taken. However, this naturally 
limited the depth of the discussion and of this article.  
 
The domestic structures of “Palestine” can easily explain how the shift towards 
terrorism of the PA in early 2002 came about. Looking at the institutional level, the 
most obvious aspect is that the Palestinian Authority is de facto not democratic. 
Yassir Arafat reigns with autocratic powers, and there is no credible opposition 
against his government within these structures. The only opposition, strong enough 
to challenge Arafat’s power, is located outside of any institutional setting: the Hamas. 
To understand the importance of Hamas, it is important to notice that it is much more 
than a terrorist organization. Its military wing is supported by a strong Islamic social 
movement, with strong roots in society. Especially in Gaza, Hamas is highly 
respected for providing social services for the poor and disadvantaged. As a 
consequence of this involvement, Hamas is in touch with the needs and interests of 
the people. The Palestinian leadership in Ramallah in contrast is quite detached from 
the masses. Arafat and most of the men surrounding him, spend the better part of 
their lives in exile, and did not return to the occupied territories until the peace 
process started in the early nineties. This absence, especially during the first Intifada, 
combined with a highly privileged living standard led to a detachment from the 
Palestinian public. 
 
Now, at the onset of the second (al-aqsa-) Intifada all these factors became relevant. 
The masses started the uprising, instantaneously supported by Hamas and other 
militant groups. The Palestinian leadership, instead of taking a clear position, was 
waiting while the violence started to escalate and Hamas gained mass support for its 
suicide attacks on Israel. Under these circumstances, the PA was unable to judge 
how strong Hamas might become and if they might threaten its power, because there 
was no institutional setting, such as a functioning parliament, in which these 
differences might have been articulated. So, basically out of fear of loosing power, 
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the Palestinian leadership decided to go along with the masses and support terror.
  
This policy can still be called rational if the level of political actors is our reference. 
Rational choice-theorists would call every decision of every actor rational, since it 
served their personal purpose and therefore was goal-oriented. On a collective level, 
this often leads to an irrational outcome, which might have been the case here. 
Israel, a democratic state, made a similar policy shift, which, however, was brought 
about by elections. During the election campaign in late 2001 and early 2002, the 
second Intifada had already started. Ariel Sharon, candidate of the rightist Likud 
party, himself stimulated the uprising by visiting the “harm al-sharif”. This was 
perceived as a strong provocation for Palestinians, as they consider this holy site part 
of Palestine. Under the impression of rising violence and the failure of the peace 
process, the Israeli public shifted to the right and called for a tougher stand towards 
the Palestinians. Ariel Sharon won the elections and instantaneously translated this 
shift in public opinion into a much tougher policy towards the Palestinians, starting 
with “targeted killings” and culminating in “operation defensive shield” in spring 2002, 
meaning the forceful re-occupation of territory handed over to the PA under the Oslo-
accords.   
Policy changes in Israel can be much easier analyzed by looking at the institutional 
settings (i.e. majorities in parliament). Depending on which party gains more votes, 
policy shifts become possible; and: those shifts in foreign policy can best or even only 
be explained by looking inside the state. Explaining a policy shift within one 
government proves to be more difficult and would ask for a deeper analysis of Israel’s 
decision making process than just the look at parliamentary majorities. In our case 
however, this was not necessary.  
 
The application of this theory to the conflict produced useful insights. Even 
though a lack of knowledge limited the discussion, many members of our workgroup 
mentioned gaining a deeper understanding of the changes in the conflict. An 
interesting point is that under this approach the push of the international community 
for a democratization of the PA makes perfect sense. Liberal approaches explain the 
empirical phenomenon that democracies never fight each other. Although such 
thoughts would not be more than speculation, it seems at least questionable that the 
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Palestinian people would have staged such an uprising when they felt fairly 
represented in their political system.  
 
 
BARAK AND ARAFAT PLAYING (TWO-LEVEL-)GAMES 
 
 Camp-David-Negotiations Dec.20009 
 
In December 2000, during the final days of his presidency, U.S. president Bill Clinton 
pushed for an end of violence between Palestinians and Israel by getting their 
respective leaders to negotiate a final peace agreement. These long and intense 
talks became well known as the Camp David peace negotiations. As Putnam’s two-
level-game is a tool designed to model international negotiations, we tried to figure 
out if it would be useful in explaining the failure of these talks between Ehud Barak 
(prime minister of Israel) and Yassir Arafat (President of the Palestinian Authority). 
Primarily, we will take a look at the negotiations on the international level, in 
Putnam’s terminology “level I negotiations”. Since no ratification process took place 
(there was nothing to ratify), the domestic or second level will only be regarded 
indirectly through the win-sets, which are determined by domestic factors. As already 
mentioned in our introduction to the conflict, we regard Palestine as a state, given 
that Arafat was Barak’s counterpart in the negotiations and had a separate level II. 
Representing the order of our discussion in the workgroup, a separate presentation 
of the Israeli and Palestinian win-sets will stand at the beginning. These 
presentations will be split in two sections, one describing the positions on the issues 
and another on the domestic factors influencing the size of the win-sets. Following 
this, a brief paragraph will discuss the outcome of the negotiations. The concluding 
paragraph will look into the usefulness of Putnam’s model to explain the failure of 
“Camp David”. 
 
The major issues determining Arafat’s win-set were the question of land and Israeli 
settlements, the status of Jerusalem and the question of the refugees. A crucial 
aspect for Arafat was the status of ’67 was regarded as the starting point for the 
                                                          
9 Our main source was a very interesting article written by co-negotiators of the Camp David 
negotiations in December 2000: Agha, Hussein / Malley, Robert: Camp David: The Tragedy of Errors, 
in: New York Book Reviews, Vol. 48 No. 13 (August 9, 2001), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/14380 
(accessed on February 15, 2005). 
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negotiations and not the actual status quo. Therefore his win-set included a very high 
percentage of land to be returned, coming close to 100% of occupied territory (better: 
to be given back and not simply given as part of an Israeli offer). This can be 
illustrated by the fact that Palestinians see all of Israeli territory as originally 
Palestinian homeland; therefore the acceptance of an Israeli state is for them already 
a concession of land. Jerusalem as capital of a Palestinian state was a key point in 
Arafat’s win-set. With respect to Arafat’s claim on the refugee’s right of return to 
Israel, there seemed to be greater leeway. Given these positions, it seems evident 
that Arafat’s win-set was rather small.  
Three additional aspects of the anticipated domestic “ratification-process” reduced 
the win-set further in size. First, past experiences in negotiations raised suspicion 
towards any Israeli proposal. Given the perceived history of Israeli defections from 
past promises, Arafat’s greatest concern was not to give the impression to domestic 
veto-players of being deceived by Israel once again. Second, Arafat’s autocratic 
position left the militant islamists as veto-players being the only obstacles in the 
ratification process. The extremists are articulating their opposition not in terms of 
votes, but rather through their influence on public opinion taking people to the streets 
and perpetrating violent attacks on both sides of the green line. Hence an 
unfavorable outcome could have sparked a Palestinian civil war. Finally, the costs of 
no-agreement for the Palestinian President were negligible, as his political position in 
the given situation was not at all threatened in case of a failure; a poor agreement 
would have been much more risky. As already mentioned, the basis for the 
negotiations for Arafat was the status of 1967 rather than the status quo. This further 
lowered his perceived costs of no-agreement, as he also expected the position of 
Palestine to improve in the long run. International pressure on Israel to give up 
occupation would rise, as would economic pressure in Israel and the demographic 
conditions of Arabic population. It could also be assumed that Arafat had the history 
of Lebanon in mind, where Hezbollah achieved Israeli withdrawal over time by use of 
force only, not making any concessions. All these facts pushed the costs of no-
agreement for Arafat to zero and he therefore neglected the need to enlarge his win-
set. 
Barak’s primary objective was to reach a final agreement, settling all issues between 
the two sides, rather than a step-by-step approach. His attitude was marked by 
distrust towards the Palestinian leadership. The core issue for the Israeli side was 
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security. Settlements in the West Bank and Gaza were seen as Israeli territory, but 
following the “land for peace”-doctrine, Barak was willing to give up most of this land 
in order to accomplish a peace-settlement. The notion of Jerusalem as part of a 
Palestinian state or even as its capital was rather unthinkable for Barak. A 
comparably strong position was taken on the issue of the refugee’s right of return to 
Israel, as a probable influx of Palestinian refugees into the Israeli heartland was 
feared to end the Jewish character of Israel. What clearly enlarged the win-set of 
Barak was the great demand of the Israeli public for a final agreement providing 
security and stability, i.e. peace.  
Clearly distinctive in determining Barak’s win-set was the institutionalized and thus 
predictable ratification process on the Israeli side through the Knesset. Given party 
majorities in the parliament and favorable national polls made it easier for the prime 
minister to calculate his win-sets. The missing predictability of Palestinian ratification 
process made it more difficult for Barak to assess his counter-part’s win-set. The 
Prime Minister also couldn’t be sure whether an agreed contract would be followed 
also by radical Palestinian opposition groups, since they are not integrated into the 
structures of political power in the Palestine Authority but articulating their protest “on 
the streets”. 
It seems impossible, at least with the information at hand, to exactly determine the 
win-sets of both sides. Even though an agreement on the issues seemed to be 
possible, the win-sets finally didn’t overlap. This was primarily due to the Palestinian 
domestic constellations analyzed above, which put Arafat in a position where he 
didn’t feel able to make any concessions. Additionally, the lack of knowledge about 
each other’s win-sets seemed to be fatal and consequently led to serious mistrust. 
Arafat was most concerned not to reach an agreement, but to be seen as a tough 
negotiator defending Palestinian interests and not to be fooled by the Israelis. The 
perceived low costs of no-agreement by Arafat also contributed to the failure of Camp 
David. The existence of silent allies on the respective other side should have made 
the peace talks easier, but there were also allies opposing peace on both sides. 
 
Putnam’s two-level-games could be well applied to our case and certainly proved 
useful to understand the negotiations. As it is often the case with models, the 
problems in application lie in the details, here especially in determining the exact 
composition of the win-sets. The Two-Level-Games are therefore to be seen as an 
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instrument to grasp the dynamics of such international negotiations, their links to the 
domestic area and the motivation of the chief negotiators (which we didn’t really 
inspect here). They are a very good tool to connect international and domestic level 
and to study their links and dynamics, rather than to examine both levels separately.  
 
 
COGNITIVE APPROACHES IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT 
 Decision Maker: Brain 
 
 
 
Cognitive Approach focuses on individual decision makers as processors and 
managers of information. Consequently, states are neither unitary actors nor actors 
at all. Decisions are taken at the individual level and hence the individual’s belief 
system must be examined to understand how. We will therefore take a closer look at 
the two most important decision makers of the conflict, Yassir Arafat and Ariel 
Sharon, and their belief systems. Afterwards, we will try to illustrate the impact of 
these belief systems on particular decisions. Before evaluating the benefits of a 
cognitive approach for the analysis of the Middle East conflict, we will examine the 
prospects for initiating a learning process. 
Arafat has a military or rather: guerrilla background. He has lived most of his life 
underground or in forced exile before returning to Palestine and becoming the 
political leader of his people. He repeatedly experienced the use of violence as 
helpful in achieving political goals. His self-image of a fighter is expressed by the 
battle-dress he was constantly wearing, even when meeting other statesmen. Arafat 
is said to have some kind of paranoia of loosing his power by betrayers inside his 
own ranks, so he is very careful not to enrage any potential opposition forces. This 
narrows his scope in negotiations and makes him look almost exclusively at domestic 
constellations by ignoring Israel’s restrictions. Besides these personal aspects, 
cultural norms and values also play a vital role as impersonal social powers. In Arab 
societies, defeat in general is seen as maybe the biggest disgrace or humiliation. 
Strength and power are therefore central values, so that Arafat has to present himself 
as a strong defender of Palestine rather than as somebody who is able to agree to 
compromises. The historical background is especially important in explaining 
Arafat’s, and Palestinians in general, very strong self-perception as victims of Israel, 
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but also as victims of Arab neighbours and as victims of the super powers, who all 
neglected their support for the Palestinian struggle for independence. Given the 
many incidents of suppression by Israel and Israeli defection from treaties, Israel is 
not seen as a partner in negotiations, but rather as an enemy against whom one has 
to defend one’s own interests. 
 
Although coming from a very different cultural background, Sharon’s belief system 
shows some similar features. His career started at the military, where he spent 
almost his entire life. The ex-General fought in all of Israel’s wars since 1948 and it 
therefore seems obvious that he has no fundamental objections towards the use of 
military force to achieve political goals. He rather fears that weakness might lead to 
the destruction of Israel. For him, the Arab slogan, “Throw the Jews into the sea” is 
still representing a credible menace. In the eyes of Sharon, this existentialistic threat 
can only be met by military force, since Israel and the Jews never got any support 
from outside forces (Holocaust-experience). Sharon also enjoys the image of being a 
political underdog in the political scene in Israel. He always has to fight opposition 
from the leftist political establishment. Standing against opposition seems to make 
him even stronger and more determined to have it his way. This makes him, just like 
Arafat, resistant to compromises. Those features of Sharon’s belief system already 
indicate some difficulties that might arise when negotiating the Palestinian future. 
 
Belief systems are filters and thus do not determine any actions. Decisions are still 
taken i.e. with regard to military/political restrictions and to the domestic public, but 
may be altered by personal aspects of the decision maker. Therefore it seems hard 
or even impossible to identify any specific decisions which can only be explained by 
cognitive aspects, but still: Other outcomes are possible, if the same circumstances 
are perceived through a different belief system. The most obvious influence in our 
case would be the military experience of both Arafat and Sharon, who therefore seem 
to “filter out” political options and swing to military solutions. In the face of the rising 
second Intifada, both decision makers chose violent paths – Arafat by supporting 
terror and Sharon by forcefully reoccupying the territories already administered by the 
PA. Arafat left the path paved by the Oslo peace process and returned to violence by 
supporting the second Intifada in early 2001, while Sharon answered with the 
“Operation Defensive Shield” rather than diplomatic solutions. Both leaders distrust 
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political solutions, which can be explained by their biographical experience and not 
necessarily by assuming “rational”, goal oriented behaviour. Another example for the 
influence of cognitive aspects on the conflict is the refusal of Sharon to meet or talk to 
Arafat. Sharon has seen him as a terrorist and his personal enemy ever since their 
military encounter in Beirut, Lebanon in 1982. The cognitive approach stresses the 
importance of inter-subjectivity for the constitution of reality. Here, this would mean, 
that since they both consider each other as leaders prone to use violence, in reality 
violence is being used and regarded as the only option. 
 
An important question for cognitive approaches is the possibility of learning. Can 
learning be initiated, and if so, how? With regard to Sharon and Arafat, this must be 
seen as rather difficult. Their advanced age, along with a lot of political experience, is 
certainly the most telling indicator hinting towards a lack of learning capacity and the 
difficulty to change their perceptions and beliefs. Both of them appear to be examples 
of cognitive consistency, since they seem to ignore any information that does not fit 
into their belief system or make this information fit in by misinterpreting it. A good 
example is the failure of the Middle East Quartet in changing their policies. This can 
be interpreted as a failure in changing Arafat’s and Sharon’s perceptions of reality 
which is in fact filtered by their belief systems. Occasions that, according to theorists, 
induce learning, such as important personal, or societal events, did not occur while 
Sharon and Arafat where in power.  
 
The cognitive approach seems to give some helpful hints towards understanding the 
situation as of summer 2004, especially the lack of movement. But it is im possible to 
conclude that the choices made can only be explained by the decision makers’ belief 
systems when it comes to specific decisions. There are always political/military 
“realities” that restrain behaviour and there is always a public opinion that influences 
the decision making process. As mentioned above, belief systems function as a filter 
rather than a source for decisions taken. From this perspective, the emphasis on the 
individual leader seems to be productive. It opens up the possibility of changing the 
politics of a state (be it by changing the leader) and makes it possible to include 
personal features of decision makers. It would seem absurd to deny that personal 
experience and cognitive perception of human beings (which politicians are, too) 
would not have any effect on their decisions taken. A more Gandhi-like political 
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leader in the Middle East would definitely have contributed to a different outcome in 
the region, even if the military, political and historical circumstances would have been 
the same. 
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BY KATHARINA HOFFMANN 
CONFLICT SETTING: IRAQ – AN INTRODUCTION 
 
When elaborating core elements of a 
long-lasting conflict, one is confronted 
not only with the most influential 
agents, but also with several structural 
aspects, determining the conflict 
situation. Depending on the respective 
theoretical approach, geographical 
features, deposits of natural resources, 
historical developments (or rather their 
instrumentalization in the conflict), the 
ethnic, religious and social structure of 
society, may serve as explanatory 
factors.  
In order not to overstress our analysis, 
the working group decided to concentrate on the most recent crisis of 2002/2003, 
which came to a head with the claim of US President George W. Bush to enforce the 
destruction of weapons of mass destruction, upon which the UN Security Council 
Resolution 687 (cease fire resolution 1991) had agreed, and Iraq’s rejection to 
cooperate with the inspectors of UNMOVIC10 and IAEA11, which according to the UN 
Security Council Resolution 687 and 1441 (2002) had the mandate to monitor the 
disarmament. This confrontation led to the third Gulf War. The US-led operation “Iraq 
Freedom” started with air raids on Baghdad on 20 March 2003 and ended on 9 April 
after coalition tanks rolled into Baghdad. 
Since the aim of our working group primarily lies in testing the explanatory power of 
different theories of International Relations and not in analyzing causes and solution 
strategies of the conflict, this introduction will present a relatively reductionist outline 
of the main agents involved in the conflict. Good theories, too, are in principle 
parsimonious and simplifying. 
                                                          
10 UNMOVIC:  UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission   
11 IAEA: International Atom Energy Agency 
IRAQ CONFLICT
Source: Central Intelligence Agency,  
http://ww .lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/iraq_pol_2004.jpg 
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We will hence refer to Kenneth Waltz’ three “levels of analysis12” providing 
fundamental tools of analysis in International Relations. The first level stresses the 
role of individuals as agents, whilst the second image is focusing on the societal and 
national context. The third image is related to the global structure of the international 
system, formed by coactions of the units. Therefore the relation between states and 
relevant transnational and international actors have to be taken into account. 
The Iraq Crisis is not an internal conflict, so it appears only natural to first concentrate 
on the third level. One of the most important international actors are the United 
Nations and the IAEA. In 1991 the Second Gulf War following Iraq’s invasion in 
Kuwait ended with the UN Ceasefire Resolution 687, imposing the destruction of 
biological, nuclear and chemical weapons under control of a UN Special Commission 
(UNSCOM). Due to its position to provide an international legitimacy for military 
actions against Iraq, the United Nations had functioned more or less as a mediator at 
least until March 2003. The UNMOVIC and IAEA had been in charge of verification 
for Iraq’s deposits of BNC weapons and provided substantial information influencing 
the decision making process of the UN members. Regarding the relations between 
states most important seem to be the relation between Iraq and the USA as well as 
Iraq’s attitude towards the UN. Iraq’s cooperation with UNSCOM had been 
characterized by diverse attempts to impede the inspector’s work. The inspections 
had been almost totally blocked from 1997 to November 2002, being resumed only in 
reaction to massive international pressure. The tension between the USA and Iraq 
can be assed as critical, since the USA still perceived the Iraq as a threat to 
international security. Applying the classification of the world system approach the 
Iraq belongs to the periphery being isolated from international economic and political 
cooperation due to the sanctions stipulated in 1990 (UNSR 661), while the USA 
constitutes one core center of the world system. 
A look on the second image including national and sub-national actors may be 
illuminative concerning the emergence of 2002/2003 crisis. 
The United States Government, supported by 30 states which formed the “coalition of 
the willing”, appears to be (aggressor in) the initiator of the third Gulf War, arguing 
that Iraq’s possible use of weapons of mass destruction necessitates “pre-emptive 
action”. In September 2002 U.S. President George W. Bush raised the issue of Iraq’s 
disarmament in front of the UN General Assembly, declaring that should the UN 
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Security Council not enforce the process, the United States would consider unilateral 
strategies of disarmament. There are a variety of interests of the U.S. Government in 
the conflict including the “war on terrorism” proclaimed in consequence of 9-11, 
internal legitimacy, as well as geo-strategic and economic aspects concerning e.g. 
the deposits of oil in the region. Turning to the U.S.-American sub-national level, 
public support of the Government’s Iraq policy had been generally high. Focusing 
mainly on the question of unilateral action versus multilateral action, two camps 
within the Bush administration could be distinguished: On the one hand, the neo-
conservatives (represented by Vice President Richard Cheney as well as Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld) perceived Iraq as an immediate threat for vital national 
interests and believed that an involvement of the United Nations would only delay 
necessary measures. On the other hand, there was the assumption (by Secretary of 
State Collin Powell et. al.), that unilateral action would damage U.S. long term 
interests. 
The debate on the strategy to deal with Iraq divided not only the UN Security Council 
but Europe as well. Whilst the leaders of Great Britain, Denmark, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain together with most of the then EU candidates supported of the U.S. policy 
towards Iraq, Germany and France et.al opposed unilateral military action against it.  
The United Kingdom, due to the important role it played in the history of modern Iraq, 
can be described as the traditional and most important partner in the US-led 
“coalition of the willing” concerning US-Iraq-policy. In spite of backing the US position 
in the course of Gulf War III in official statements very early, the decision to 
participate in military action even without an UN Resolution had been made only after 
the USA had already given Hussayn the ultimatum.  
The neighboring countries, even though most affected by direct consequences of a 
war, could exert only limited influence on the question of military action against Iraq. 
Apart from Jordan, which sought not to jeopardize its close relations to Washington, 
the regional actors rejected the U.S. policy towards Iraq with differing intensity. 
Different motivations, as et al. the fear of Iraq’s disintegration leading to regional 
instability or an interest in keeping U.S. influence in the region at bay are decisive. In 
view on Iraq the main actor on this level appeared to be the Baathis regime. The 
Baathist regime in Iraq could be described as a dictatorship with strong features of a 
patronage system, relying on tribal structures, domestic repression and economic 
inducement. Apart from the Baathist Party and the bureaucracy, the armed forces 
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and security services, being split in several competing organizations, are said to have 
been a main source of regime stability in Iraq. Broadening the range of options for 
Hussayn by supporting the regime they play a vital role in the conflict. The organized 
opposition in exile, though, plays an important role. The almost 40 parties and 
religious movements are taking action from their London base and gain vital political 
support from Washington. In scope of the “Future of Iraq Project”, which has been 
initiated by the U.S. Government, the Iraq National Congress and the Supreme 
Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq, elaborated, a strategy for transition to 
democracy. Furthermore the Iraq interim Government had been formed out of 
members of these opposition parties. 
Finally the individual level has to be scrutinized. The two main characters 
immediately coming to mind are Saddam Hussayn and George W. Bush. The 
excessive power of Saddam Hussayn arose from the system of power he had 
established, since it was based on personal ties and loyalty to his person. Regarding 
George W. Bush there might be mentioned, that his politics were determined by his 
conservative attitude and strong religious back ground.  
As mentioned before, this introduction is supposed to give only a short overview of 
the conflict setting, in order to provide a first fundament for the debates in the working 
groups. Below you will find some suggestions for literature and interesting web sites 
for a more in-depth analysis of different aspects concerning the situation in Iraq. 
Further Readings: 
Fürtig, Henner: Kleine Geschichte des Irak. Beck, München 2003. 
 
Krause, Joachim: Die Krise um den Irak und die internationale Ordnung, in: Kieler 
 Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik No.4, Jan. 2003, p. 1-25. 
 
Lawrence, Christopher: Iraq, 9/11, and the War. Understanding Mass Belief in the Perceived 
Threat of Saddam Hussein and Support for War. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of 
the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago Illinois 2004, p.1-15. 
 
Münkler, Herfried: Der neue Golfkrieg. Hamburg: Rowohlt 2003. 
 
Press-Barnathan, Galia: The War against Iraq and International Order: From Bull to Bush, 
in: International Studies Review, Vol. 6. 2004, p. 195-212. 
 
Http:// www.state.gov US Department of State: Official statements 
Http://www.rferl.org Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty 
Http:// www.icg.org International Crisis Group 
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DO IDEAS MATTER? 
A Constructivist Approach To The Iraq Crisis 
 
 
What does the 2002/2003 Iraq crisis look like from a constructivist point of view? 
After having a short look on texts and essays introducing constructivism in IR, the 
question upcoming first is: Does “the” one constructivist point of view exist and does 
it provide a clear frame of laws and hypotheses, which we can apply to our case? 
Constructivism in International Relations rather implies a wide range of approaches, 
which propose constructivism as a meta-theory, a social theory or theoretical and 
empirical perspective, rather than a clearly shaped homogenous concept. 
Nevertheless, there are some common assumptions upon which the different 
branches are based.  
First, the ontological perspective assumes that reality is socially constructed and 
cannot per se be experienced. It can be assessed, or “constructed” but only against 
the background of discourses in which the agents and observer are integrated. As a 
result the epistemological assumption considers knowledge as a construct as well. 
This leads to the question how these social constructs are produced and which 
discourses are decisive for certain settings.  
Since this provides more of a breeding ground for a (even philosophical) debate 
which easily gets out of hand, and therefore is not suitable for a short discussion on 
crisis in Iraq, we decided to refer to Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International 
Politics.  
Wendt concentrates on the problem how preferences and interests of actors can 
change. According to his theory one core element of analysis is the identity of the 
agents. Identity as well as interests, deriving from identity, are based on shared ideas 
and are socially constructed in course of interaction between different actors. Though 
he does not completely evade opening the black-box “state”, Alexander Wendt 
mainly looks at the third level, because he aims at explaining structural changes in 
the international system. He as well proceeds from the assumption, that the 
international system is principally anarchic, but points out that it is structured by 
identities, depending on social and individual cognition. The social set which can be 
found in the international system ranges from adversary, rival to friend.  
Against this background, the following questions structured our discussion:  
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Which patterns of identity and interests had been decisive in the Iraq crisis? Which 
ideas and perceptions had been significant for the change of international 
cooperation in course of Iraq crisis and before? Does a re-definition of identity can be 
observed? 
In order to get an idea of the structure and the perception of roles determining the 
international system in the period of the conflict, we tried to find out patterns of 
identity of Iraq and USA, while first focusing on the mutual perception. In the second 
step we concentrated on the countries’ self-perception. The mutual image of both 
USA and Iraq had been more or less the same, only the argumentation differed. They 
considered each other as enemies. That implies a high willingness to use violence 
against each other. As officially argued by the USA, Iraq presented a threat toward 
international security and therefore a thread to the U.S. – American security. From 
the Iraq point of view, the United States did not only undermine the Baath’ regime 
through various action, but threatened it directly by claiming a regime change in Iraq. 
Due to the fact that a digression from the structure of the international system would 
be too far reaching, it should only be mentioned, that the U.S. assessment of Iraq’s 
role had been supported widely. In contrast, the role attributed to the U.S.A. had 
been mainly the one of a “friend”. Since this set of perceptions can, at least after the 
second gulf war, be considered as a relatively stable, we argued that the mutual 
attitude has only limited importance for the emergence of the current crisis. 
Discussing elements of Iraq’s self-perception, we figured that the claim to become or 
to be a regional power had been decisive for Iraq’s foreign politics, but at present at 
least no action in this direction can be observed. In view of Saddam Hussein’s non-
cooperative position, one can assume that the stability of his regime was assured 
(beyond doubt) in his own perception. To sum up it can be said that the self-
perception of Iraq had been relatively stable as well.  
Investigating the U.S. foreign policy, some changes being decisive for the crisis, can 
be determined. Most obviously is the decreasing importance of international 
cooperation in U.S. foreign politics, since the military action against Iraq without U.N. 
approval. 
Changes in means, changes in interests, changes in identity? 
A main feature of U.S.-American self-perception is the image of a world power by 
means as well as by mission. Moreover, self-description as democratic society based 
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on Christian values, constitutes a significant characteristic of U.S.-American identity, 
which in recent times serves as criteria for negative identification against others. 
The concept of democratic peace as well as the assumption that democracy and 
stability are exportable runs through their foreign policy strategies. An important 
discourse broaches the issue on strength and, coming along with it, security. The 
image of the invulnerable society has been deeply challenged by the Al-Quaida 
attack on the World Trade Center in 2001. 9-11 appears to be a turning point, 
because it triggered a change in the discourses concerning U.S.-American identity. 
Efforts to deepen the surveillance of potentially dangerous tendencies at the level of 
society and to establish an alert system for terror attacks give evidence for a 
profound perception of a security deficit. 
As mentioned above, the division between societies based on Islamic values and 
Christian societies became a frequently used rhetoric. In scope of these recent 
processes the re-definition of Iraq as an imminent threat and the new consideration of 
means and options can be explained as an attempt to regain the feeling of security in 
the U.S.-American society. Self-confidence and security can be seen both as socially 
constructed phenomena. Because of their reflexive character the revaluation of the 
perception can result in consequent and successful action against a clearly defined 
opponent. Since Al-Quaida has not the qualities of an equal partner, being neither 
state nor international organization based on international law, which in consequence 
puts constrains to direct sanctions, the USA tried to shift the conflict to the state’s 
level, while taking action against states potentially protecting terrorist groups. The 
fact, that the situation in Iraq had been a repeated topic since the war in 1991, can be 
seen as an supportive element for the decision to concentrate on Iraq. 
As already mentioned, a revaluation of cooperation can be observed in the U.S. 
Foreign Policy during the crisis. This rises the question whether the change can be 
explained as well by going back to the discourse of security? According to Wendt, 
cooperation becomes likely if interests and actions of states are based on shared 
ideas. In course of the military action against Iraq, the United States did not 
principally deny cooperation, but the strategies mapped out by the U.N. did not match 
their U.S.-American objectives. Arguing that the first priority of the U.S. strategy has 
been to regain the feeling of security, it stands to reason that the interests differed 
from those of the most international actors. A continuation of U.N. inspections and 
sanctions leads, if at all, only to long term success. It could have been regarded 
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rather as weakness, than as an expression of the power and capacity to act, as it had 
been considered to be necessary for reestablishing the tarnished image of the 
countries security.  
The decision to engage in military action with disregard to the U.N. position had been 
supported by other ongoing processes and discourses, like the softening of the 
“sovereignty” concept as institution in the international system. An increasingly 
intensive debate on humanitarian intervention in the early 1990ies, which has been 
closely linked to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, led to a widespread acceptance, 
that in case of doubt humanitarian intervention overrides the violation of sovereignty. 
This example shows that transaction cost can be reduced by such changing 
perceptions. 
Albeit our analysis had been without doubt simplifying, not only by taking exclusively 
U.S.A. and Iraq in consideration and arguing mainly at the third level, the 
constructivist approach proved to be helpful for explaining and understanding key 
processes of the Iraq crisis in 2002/03.  
 
 
 
DECISION OVER A “SECOND RESOLUTION” - A PRISONER’S 
DILEMMA? 
 
Rational Choice Approache 
 
After the introduction to Rational Choice as a meta-theory our working group had 
been asked to apply the prisoner’s dilemma – one of the most popular games of 
game theory – to a situation taken out of the Iraq crisis and to discuss afterwards the 
explanatory power of this approach. 
In spite of the parsimony of this theoretical approach, the question, which situation 
would fit in the game’s setting had not been easy to answer. Since the model 
promises explanatory power for negotiations, we decided to apply the PD-model to 
the question, whether to pass a “second resolution” in the security council, which 
would authorize the United States and the so-called “Coalition of the willing” to 
implement Iraq’s disarmament via military campaign. Following a nearly 3 month 
debate, Great Britain, Spain and the United States in February 2003 came forward 
with a draft resolution, which declared Iraq’s breach of UN Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1441 and referred to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, considering 
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action in the case of threat to the international peace and security. France, Russia 
and China, three of the five veto-holding members of the Security Council, voted 
against military action, preferring an extension of the restarted UN weapons 
inspections. Hence the resolution failed, which did not prevent a military campaign 
against Iraq.  
Just as the setting of the prisoner’s dilemma is based on a short story, we first tried to 
develop the pursuant “story” for our setting.  
Therefore we had to outline the interests of the “prisoners,” who in this case are the 
United States, Great Britain and Spain (prisoner 1) on the one hand and Germany, 
France and China (prisoner 2) on the other hand. The overall common interest 
seems to be international security and peace and as a result the disarmament of Iraq. 
The best practice option for prisoner 1 would be military action against Iraq 
legitimized by a UNSCR. For prisoner 2 the best option would be to avoid military 
action in order to maintain international stability. Cooperation would mean the 
adoption of a common UN resolution resulting in a common strategy towards Iraq. 
Defection therefore would be rejection of a common resolution resulting in unilateral 
action. Four situations are to be considered:  
Situation 1: The “coalition of the willing” agrees to continue the weapons 
inspections. In the case that evidence is discovered for Iraq’s arsenal of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) they will argue that “pre-emptive” military action is legitimate 
given the right to self-defense defined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The second 
resolution draft passes, providing the mandate for military action, if WMD are really 
found. According to the “prisoner’s dilemma”, this scenario should provide high costs 
for prisoner 1 and low costs for prisoner 2. In our setting the cost for Germany, 
France and China and for the UN are at least lower, in the case that the draft 
resolution passes – given the evidence of a material breach of UNSCR 1441 on the 
part of Iraq. Although military action is generally undesirably, collective military 
intervention within the framework of the UN is perceived as not to jeopardize the 
stability of the international order. Furthermore the operation draws legitimacy from 
the fact that Saddam Hussein denies compliance with international demands and 
presents a threat to international security. 
From the US’s point of view, the costs of collective action are high, since this would 
come along with further attempts to resolve the crisis with political means and the 
continuation of the UN inspector’s work, which already proved to be unable to realize 
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their mission. This loss of time causes a highly risky situation concerning international 
peace and would not match the US interests.  
Situation 2: Arguing that Iraq poses no imminent threat, the UN Security Council 
rejects a second resolution. Hereupon the “coalition of the willing” decides on military 
action against Iraq without UN approval. The theoretical game setting entails very 
high costs for “prisoner 2” but complete success for “prisoner 1”. Within the scope 
of our story, this would mean more or less success for the United States and its 
allies, because they assume to disarm Iraq with their preferred means. The costs for 
Germany, France and China are very high, because they are not able to prevent 
unilateral military action and aggression against another state and thus have failed to 
solve an international crisis within the framework provided by the UN.  
Situation 3: According to the PD model the third constellation should entail high cost 
for each of the prisoners. In our setting the cost for both prisoners would be relatively 
high if the resolution passes and both sides would realize a military operation against 
Iraq on the basis of only vague evidence concerning Iraq’s WMD. Even if the 
operation leads to complete disarmament of the regime, the lack of fundamental 
evidence which is given concerning the topic of WMD in the country, would question 
whether Security Council Resolutions are able to ensure legality in the international 
law of military action any more. Referring to this argument, some of the UN members 
would not support military action, even if it would be authorized by a UNSCR. This 
would suggest that the United States would face complications in diplomatic relations 
with opponent states like Germany or France. Nevertheless, compared with unilateral 
action an UN approval would lower US-American costs. Last but not least there are 
the real costs of war and the country’s reconstruction in the aftermath of war.  
Situation 4:  
The less cost-intensive setting for both would be the solution of the crisis without 
military action. Taking into account the interests of the USA and Iraq, it appears 
difficult to say what such a solution should look like, but one proposal would be 
proven disarmament of the regime in Iraq reached by peaceful means, such as the 
work of UN inspectors and political negotiations. Since this setting does not depend 
on the decision of the two prisoners only, but on the degree of cooperation accepted 
by Iraq, it does not fit the PD model very well.  
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MATRIX OF THE CLASSIC PD MODEL AND THE MATRIX OF OUR SETTING 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
SET OF PREFERENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After all, does the setting developed for the second resolution correspond to the PD 
model and thus can the outcome be explained by it? Having a closer look at the four 
constellations, first of all, the argumentation obviously is not stringent. When 
comparing the original PD matrix and the matrix developed within the working group, 
which gives an overview over the possible settings and the respective costs, it is 
obvious that the cost for the prisoners in at least two settings differ from the model. 
The differences are caused by several preconditions which differ in the chosen 
example. First of all the situation focusing the UN Security Council Resolution is, of 
course, more complex, than the situation assumed in the model. Rational Choice 
theory requires a stable and straight set of preferences which lead to action. Our 
example appears to be too complex to reduce the actor’s preferences to a 
hierarchical set of four or five preferences. While analyzing the interests of the UN we 
have to consider the special interests of the veto-holding members. Obviously, they 
cannot easily be reduced to a consistent interest; even the interests and preferences 
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of the USA cannot clearly be reduced to one strategy. They depend on several 
variables such as support within society, economic development, and the 
international position of the respective (sub-) actors, to mention only the most evident 
factors. The set of preferences of both prisoners in our model are varying (see table 
2). One of the highest preferences of the “coalition of the willing” seems to be 
intervention in order to establish security. France, Germany, and China in contrast 
highly prefer the avoidance of intervention. Furthermore, the external setting cannot 
be considered as clearly determined in the case of the “second resolution” as 
opposed to the model, because there is no district attorney or officer determining the 
punishment. According to the PD model the prisoners both would not cooperate and 
therefore both have to face relatively high costs. The final decision of the UN Security 
Council regarding military action against the Baghdad regime had been not to pass 
the resolution draft. The “coalition of the willing” then started the operation “Iraq 
Freedom” without UN-authorization. So the agents did not choose the expected 
outcome, but the United Nations (France, Germany and China) had to assume a very 
high cost, while the cost for the United States were said to be relatively low in terms 
of pursuing their interests (see setting 2). Evidently the explanatory power of the 
prisoner’s dilemma had failed. The question remains, what are the reasons for this 
failure? Comparing the basic assumption of the prisoner’s dilemma with their 
application to our example, the agents’ perception of the external setting can be 
identified as remarkably different. While the strategies of both prisoners are based on 
the same information about the external environment and options, which had been 
explicitly pointed out by the district attorney, the agents’ perception of the external 
setting in the Iraq crisis differed widely. France, Germany and China, relying upon the 
results of the UN inspections, did not see the necessity for urgent action; whereas the 
United States perceived the Iraq Regime as an imminent threat for the national 
interests as well as international security. Given the deviating perceptions, the set of 
preferences differed to a degree that made cooperation unlikely. During the final 
discussion, the explanatory power of the prisoner’s dilemma for our example had 
been doubted. The working group argued that many of the core assumptions the 
setting relied upon had to be further scrutinized. One of the questions which arose is 
whether the disarmament of the Iraq had been the U.S. Government’s prior aim, or 
whether it primarily functioned as an intermediate stage for another strategy. In this 
case the set of preferences would be respectively altered.  
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BY CHRISTINE SCHUSTER: 
“THE CONFLICT OF THE GREAT LAKES”13  
 
This text is supposed to give an 
introduction into the Conflict in and 
around the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. After first of all indicating 
the extent of the conflict with some 
figures that make clear why it’s 
called war, a very short historical 
introduction is given, comprising 
the colonial time up to today. In this 
historical overview the most 
important actors and the essential 
sources of conflict are named, as 
are the most effective (if at all) 
peace steps. The introdution ends 
with an exclusive image of the actual status and the future problems. 
The Conflict in the DRC (formerly known as Zaire) has been called Africa’s First 
World War There have been a number of complex reasons for the designation of the 
conflict, including competition for basic resources such as water, access and control 
over rich minerals and other natural resources which can be found in this central-
African country that is the size of half of Europe. This led to various political disputes, 
especially in the two richest provinces, North- and Southkivu.  
Since the outbreak of fighting in August 1998, at least 3.3 million people, mostly 
women, children and the elderly, are estimated to have died because of the conflict, 
                                                          
13 „The Conflict of the Great Lakes“ is a literal denomination for the war in and around the today 
Democratic Republic of Congo, former Belgish-Congo, Republic of Congo and Zaire. It refers to the 
rich areas around Lakes Tanganyka, Albert and the flow-ins of  Lake Victoria, representing the ending 
of the great river Congo. This area has always been and still is a source of conflict about exploitation 
rights and political control. 
THE CONFLICT IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency,  
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/congo_demrep_pol98.jpg 
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most from disease and starvation. In addition to that, more than 2.25 million people 
have been driven from their homes, many of them beyond the reach of humanitarian 
agencies.  
Brief History 
 
As with most conflicts in Africa, the current situation is strongly linked to the legacy of 
colonialism. The conflict’s history starts with the violent 1885 Belgian imposition of 
colonial rule under King Leopold II, whom himself never visited the region. 
 After 75 years of colonial rule, the Belgians left very abruptly, relinquishing the 
political rights to the people of Congo in 1960. However, independence did not mean 
that economic rights enabled all inhabitants to benefit from the rich resource base. 
Still, former white colonialists dominated the economic, political and especially 
military ordering of the country. Furthermore, conflicts between different ethnic 
groups and regional powers about the new governmental structure arose. A few 
months after Patrice Lumumba, head of MNC, Congolesian national libertarian party, 
became elected head of state, he was overthrown with US and European support by 
his former ally, Mobutu Sese Soko. Besides his claims for more independence for the 
Congolese people and his accusation of the former colonialists, Lumumba was 
suspected of cooperating with the Soviet Union during the Cold War period. 
Mobutu used his U.S.-supplied arsenal to repress his own people and plunder his 
nation's economy for three decades, until his dictatorship was overthrown by the 
AFDL (Alliance des Forces Democratiques pour la Liberation du Congo-Zaire) led 
by Laurent Desire Kabila with the aid of Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Burundi and 
Eritrea in May 1997. Kabila, also backed by the US, was accused by Congolese 
soldiers, Congolese Tutsi Banyamulenge14, Rwandan, Ugandan and some 
Burundian government troops of turning into a dictator of mismanagement, 
corruption and supporting various paramilitary groups who oppose his former allies. 
Therefore these groups themselves formed various Rebel Groups, opposing the 
government on the internal level since August 1998. As the conflict had raged on, 
rebels controlled about a third of the entire country (the eastern parts). 
                                                          
14 Banyamulenge is how the ruandish-speeking inhabitants of South-Kivu call themselves since 1967 
to distinguish themselves from hutu-refugees of  Ruanda-Urundi, how settled there, too. Literally 
translated it means “inhabtiants of Mulenge. 
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Until the assassination of Laurent Kabila in January 2001, Angola, Zimbabwe, and 
Namibia supported the Congolese government, while the rebels were backed by the 
governments of Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi. 
Various African states, primarily South Africa, tried to intervene. In the Organisation 
for African Unity (OAU, today African Union) the "Conflict of the Great Lakes" has 
always received special attention. All these efforts lead to the signing of the Lusaka 
Ceasefire Agreement in 1999, which is considered to be the base of all peaceful 
solution proceedings in the conflict. Nevertheless, combats did not stop and peace 
was fragile. There were various political problems in trying to get a UN peacekeeping 
force in to help out, while killings continued. The UN deployed a small cease-fire 
monitoring body called Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) in 1999 which 
was upgraded to the UN-Mission MONUC (Mission de l’Organisation des Nations 
Unies en République démocratique du Congo) in July 2003 to 'protect civilians under 
imminent threat of physical violence'.  
However, Amnesty International, amongst others, has noted that “MONUC has been 
a hostage to its weak mandate and has lacked the necessary equipment, personnel 
and international political backing.”15  
On January 16, 2001 Laurent Kabila himself was assassinated and his son Joseph 
Kabila became the new President of the DRC. He said that he would further 
encourage the need for cooperation with the United Nations in deployment of troops, 
strengthen the dialog of national reconciliation and help revive the stalled Lusaka 
peace agreements.16  
The so called "Innercongolese dialogue", held from February to April 2002 in Sun 
City, was supposed to comprise five components, two rebel movements (the 
Uganda-backed MLC as well as the Rwandan-backed Congolese Rally for 
Democracy), non-armed opposition groups, political parties, civil society 
organizations and the government. But the power sharing question was mainly 
negotiated between the government, the rebel groups and one opposition group. The 
Lusaka agreements (the Ceasefire agreement of 1999 and its reformulation in 2001) 
were declared dead, as various groups had had disagreements on a variety of 
issues. But also the Innercongolese-Dialog in Sun City 2002 could not solve all of 
                                                          
15 http://www.amnesty.org.uk/action/drc/international.shtml  
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them, not to mention the struggles in the implementation of the arrangement. Several 
groups counteracted the implementation, others did not fulfill what they declared. 
Parts of the society who felt underrepresented funded new groups or parties, putting 
the whole process in question. 
Nevertheless, the DRC is actually in the status of "Transition", with enormous aims:  
First of all, a Reunification, pacification and reconstruction of the country has to take 
place. Once the armed conflict is stopped or at least limited and the direct war 
damages are reconstructed, the establishment of territorial integrity and the authority 
of the state over the whole territory are what is strived for. Of course, the relationship 
between ceasefire consolidation and controlling processes is debatable, but at least 
this is how plans are. 
After the government and a territorial integration have been established, it is 
important for future coexistence that a national conciliation takes place. There, crimes 
of war will be brought to court and history is worked up. 
The important role military played during every part of the conflict, especially thinking 
back to the overthrow of the democratically elected first national government of the 
Congo, the creation of an integrated and restructured national army seems to be a 
crucial point for the chances of success of the peace process. Its actual importance 
can also be observed, looking at the numbers of arms sold between all groups of 
society and foreigners. People are organized in Rebel-Groups and their subordinates 
or use light arms in daily life, in civil war.  
For political purposes the organization of transparent and free elections for all levels, 
leading to the construction of a constitutional-democratic regime, is the predominant 
aim, but the process is hindered by various disagreements between society-groups 
and is nearly made into ridicule by the ongoing fighting, primarily in the eastern Kivu-
provinces. At the moment, the date for the election is postponed from June 2005 to 
June 2006.  
In general, the process is strongly restrained by the ongoing combats and disaccords 
concerning a diversity of economic and political interests between the following 
operating actors:  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
16 there has been a second Lusaka Ceasefire Argeement in 2001, which had also problems in its implementation. 
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• Joseph Kabila and Jean Pierre Bemba (MLC, noted on top) discussing 
the definitive arrangements in the state-structure with the other 
government parties 
• RCD-Goma and UDPS (Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrés social) 
and especially the new "Alliance for the salvation of the Inner 
Congolese Dialogue" fighting for a reopening of the Dialogue to let all 
groups participate 
• Meanwhile, UDPS and PALU (Parti Lumumbiste Unifié ), the two 
greatest political parties in the DRC, prepare the organization of the 
political opposition, as they were too divided to find a common 
candidate for the elections 
• Illegal exploitation of the resources in Eastern Congo is an important 
grade based on the civil war circumstances and the violent occupation 
of mines and other strategic territories by local groups 
• The DRC inhabits more or less 250 different ethnic groups. The highest 
concentrations are Luba (18%), Mongo (17%), Kongo (15%) and 
Asande (10%). Ethnic questions are often instrumentalized for 
economic conflicts. The most critical case is the status of the 
Banyamulenge, Congolese soldiers of Rwandan origin. 
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IS ANYBODY STILL A STATE IN CONGO? 
REALISM APPROACH 
 
 
Theories of international relations, such as Realism and Neorealism, are based on 
the interaction of states. Nevertheless, there are exceptions to these theories, which 
take “failed states” into account as well - where it is not yet clear to which state or 
power a territory belongs. In these cases, other states compete to fill the political 
vacuum with influence on the territory. This seems to be a possible scenario for the 
Congo Conflict. Hence we discussed in our workgroup the question, whether the 
Democratic Republic of Congo qualifies as a state under the criteria put forward by 
neorealism. An answer to this question would allow us to decide if the Democratic 
Republic of Congo is an actor in neorealistic terms and thus relevant for explaining 
the conflict.  
 
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was granted membership status to the 
UNO in 1971. Although this form of international recognition is usually a clear 
indicator for statehood, things are not as clear in the case of the DRC. So the 
workgroup tried to clarify the status of Congo by applying the neorealist criteria for 
states17  
Concerning the first condition, Administration (not bargaining), it has to be assumed 
that the Congolese Government does not have the capacity nor the authority to 
administrate the whole territory. The DRC actually is a state „in Transition“, with its 
first democratic elections planned for June 2005. Especially in the eastern part of the 
DRC there is an ongoing civil war concerning local domains. Therefore, the frontiers 
in this region are more or less blurred by migration and commerce. A constant 
unregulated flow of refugees pass the borders every day and the state does not have 
the means to control them. Thus, the criterion of Borders, indicating domestic / 
foreign spheres seems just as inapplicable.  
The feature of territoriality can be seen in the context of these border conditions. 
Several times in the run of the conflict, refugee flows headed in all directions - for the 
central part of the country as well as the neighbouring states. Bearing this back and 
                                                          
17 States are organizations characterized by certain attributes: administration (not bargaining), 
territoriality (not nomadism), internal sovereignty, esp. power monopoly, social homogenization (not 
patchworks etc.), external sovereignty  (no interference in domestic affairs), citizenship (not multiple 
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forth movement in mind it is highly unlikely that all the local social groups, partly 
belonging to transborder ethnics, attribute the same importance to the frontiers as the 
international society.  
This brings us to the issue of national identity (not regional or other). As the conflict 
has lasted for decades now and the complexity of ethnic, regional and national 
relations has reached to a impenetrable level, many locals orientate themselves 
towards primordial identity of family ties, being the only stable point. Even worse are 
situations in which these last family ties are destroyed violently. The created vacuum 
is often times filled by integrating into a military group - as in the case of the infant 
soldiers in the Maji Maji Militia. This militia consists in great parts of children, who are 
orphans or have been separated from their families in refugee camps or rural 
settlements. In this setting, the characteristic of citizenship (not multiple identities) 
seems to be even more futile. For example the question about the citizenship of 
some of the collectives involved in the conflict has been brought up repeatedly: Were 
the combatants Congolese or were they of Rwandan or Ugandan origin? Which 
groups of refugees have the right to settle in the DRC, which ones have to be 
accepted by the neighbouring states? On the one hand, these questions stand for the 
national and international significance that is attributed to a Congolese citizenship. 
On the other hand, and this seems to be more relevant here, these questions point 
towards the fact that there is no unambiguous concept of a Congolese citizenship to 
refer to.18  
 
By internal and external sovereignty, we mean an internal power monopoly by the 
government and its apparatus without interference in domestic affairs by foreign 
powers. Looking at internal sovereignty, the most striking feature seems to be the 
disputes within the transitional government, consisting of president Kabila and four 
vice-presidents representing different opposition groups. This integrated body has 
not lead to the expected unification but has actually deepened the rift between the 
groups in control of the territories. Consequently it cannot be assumed that the 
government controls the DRC as a whole. Apparently the integration of the different 
regional oppositions at the federal level in Kinshasa only diminished the level of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
identities), national identity (not regional or other), borders, indicating domestic/ foreign spheres, 
symbols.  
18 Read for example Antoine Lawson: " Central Africa: Integration suffers setback" in Pan African 
News Agency, March 17, 2004.  
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informality and the violence apparent in some confrontations. Nonetheless, there still 
remain local fights. 
For the second characteristic, external sovereignty, it is important to note that the 
rebel groups dominating a great part of the DRC have much closer ties with Uganda 
and Rwanda. These connections have a stronger influence on their behaviour than 
their governmental participation in the DRC. This prevents them from following 
national interests for the DRC. In addition to this, Rwanda and Uganda are also 
capable of influencing the proceedings in the DRC directly. Another clear sign for a 
lack of sovereignty is the installation of the UN mission MONUC in the DRC and its 
further remaining until today.  
 
Concerning the criterion of social homogenization (not patchworks etc.) the situation 
seems to be closely related to the points of identity, territoriality and citizenship. The 
DRC is inhabited by a variety of different ethnics, who play an important role in the 
conflict, or are instrumentalised for economic or military aspects. Any way, one 
cannot speak of social homogenization, as the social differences among the 
population are tremendous.  
 
Regarding all the trouble with the named criteria so far, the last point, state symbols, 
seems to be of little relevance. There are state symbols for the DRC (a flag, a hymn 
etc.), which have symbolic meaning for the Congolese Citizens, but as long as the 
state still is "in transition" and the conflict situation impedes social development, a 
deeper identification with the state might appear impossible.  
 
Having studied all these attributes, a clear decision in favour of one of the two 
possibilities laid down by the hypothesis is difficult. Whether the DRC can be 
considered a state acting (sovereign) in the conflict or whether the DRC represents a 
"failed" state and the only decisive actors are the other states involved in the conflict 
is hard to tell. On the one hand, the DRC does not completely fulfill a single one of 
the criteria. Hence the first possibility can be excluded.  
However, the role of the construction of a state or the "transitional state" of the DRC 
is of such great importance in the conflict that it cannot be neglected in its handling. 
The territory has a history of state-constructions since its (de)colonisation; it is 
registered in the UN states list and is recognized all over the world. More importantly, 
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its lack in sovereignty does not mean that it has no power at all. Rather the impact of 
its political and economical weight, its military staff and the limited social 
infrastructure on the course of the conflict is apparent. 
Accordingly the latter alternative, a "failed" state in hands of others, is also 
inapplicable. Negotiations about the terrain or the economical, social and political 
circumstances therein, without a decisive participation by the DRC itself seem to be 
unthinkable.  
 
Ultimately, the case of the DRC status in the "Conflict of the Great Lakes" seems to 
fit none of the actor categories proposed in the Neorealism hypothesis discussed 
here. It exemplifies the amalgamation of the levels of analysis and the demand for 
more complex investigation frames adaptable to current conflicts. 
 
APPLICATION OF PUTNAM’S “TWO-LEVEL-GAME” THEORY TO 
THE CONFLICT IN DRC 
 
The Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), or the “Conflicts of the 
Great Lakes,” as it is often called in international press, seems to have been quite 
immune to any attempts towards finding an international solution. Particularly, the two 
most important ceasefire agreements, contracted in Lusaka 1999 (LCA99) and Sun 
City 2002 (SC02), failed in their application, although, when signed, aroused a lot of 
hope.19 In order to understand the dynamics of those negotiations and the reasons 
for their failure, we will now look at them applying Putnam’s Two Level Game. We will 
start with the LCA99, as this one is more easily applicable because there is an 
international and a distinct domestic level involved. The SC02 on the other hand, 
called “Inner-Congolese Dialogue”, did not really have an international level, since 
the negotiations mainly took place between different domestic opposition groups and 
the central government. We will return to that later, when looking for an alternative for 
the failed LCA99, which we are analyzing first. 
The governments who signed the LCA99-agreement (the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Uganda, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe; see also the 
introduction to this conflict) constituted the first level, taking place on the international 
                                                          
19The German Office of Foreign Affairs still considers the LCA of 1999 as the base for all ongoing 
peace efforts in the DRC http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/de/laenderinfos/laender/laender_ 
ausgabe _html ?type _id=11&land_id=85, Downloaded on 30.08.2004  
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sphere. At the second (or domestic) level, where the “ratification” process took place, 
the rebel groups in the DRC, such as RCD and MLC, can be regarded as the most 
important actors besides the government and the political opposition. The demands 
of the rebel groups, which were or could not (be) met in the agreement, seem to have 
made the implementation of the planned peaceful arrangement impossible. Instead, 
one might get the impression that the rebel groups preferred the violent status quo, 
which according to Putnam's theory would then be a "voluntary defection".20 
Thus, our hypothesis resulting from a Two Level Game perspective would be the 
following: As the Rebel Groups in the DRC opted for an ongoing war, the LCA 99 
was spoiled in the ratification process by their "voluntary defection".   
How can we proove out hypothesis? First of all, it has to be noted that the natural 
resources within the territory of the DRC and their illegal exploitation are of great 
importance in this war. This has been discussed in detail in the „Final report of the 
Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo" by the UN21. Gertrud Kanu and 
Iseewanga Indongo-Imbanda quote the principal conclusion of this report: "the 
conflict in the Congo centres mainly on the access, the control and the commerce 
with five important resources: Colton, diamonds, copper, cobalt and gold".22 
 
Second, the close relation of the two levels makes a clear distinction between the 
political spheres more complicated and gives those actors advantages in following 
their interests, which are more or less directly present at both levels. We refer to the 
linkages between Rwanda and the RCD or Uganda and the MLC. 
There is evidence that the RCD and the MLC were forced by Rwanda and Uganda to 
sign the LCA99. This made it possible for Rwanda and Uganda to uphold a 
responsible and peaceful image on the international level, being important for their 
international reputation in commerce and politics. On the other side, the 
implementation of the LCA99 failed exactly because the rebel groups refused to 
accept the consequences. They continued with the illegal exploitation of resources in 
the terrains they controlled and almost to the same degree still control today. As 
                                                          
20 http://www.kongo-kinshasa.de/geschichte/ge_05.htm, Downloaded on 11.05.2004 
21 Resumee of the Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources 
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 2002:   
http://www.welthungerhilfe.de/WHHDE/wir/positionen/Kongo__B__rgerkrieg_als_Wirtschaftsfaktor.pdf, 
Downloaded on 2004/08/30, further explications by Frank Nyakiru, in The Monitor (Uganda) of March 
22, 2004  
22 www.kongo-kinshasa.de (downloaded on 2005/03/03), translation by C.S. 
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observed by Gertrud Kanu and Iseewanga Indongo-Imbanda, "the armed opposition 
departed several times from the agreement of Lusaka, by among other impediments 
continuing with the combats, leading to the conquest or the occupation of territories 
controlled by the Kinshasa-government".23  
 
All this was facilitated by the weakness of the Congolese state, which is financially 
supporting some of the rebel groups but still cannot control neither all of them nor its 
own territory. It is obvious that the state in general lacks power, it has no central 
control over the different regions officially subordinated to either the government or a 
rebel group. This situation results in many local fights.24 
Gertrud Kanu and Iseewanga Indongo-Imbanda describe how president L.-D. Kabila 
did neither act in favor of the LCA99-application: "Before the assassination of 
President L.-D. Kabila on 01/16/01, the conflict parties departed from the fragile 
peace-agreement frequently. President L.-D. Kabila for example refused to accept 
the "Facilitateur" of the Inner Congolese dialogue, Ket Masire, for the reason that he 
regarded him to be one-sided and demanded a revision of the Peace agreement 
from Lusaka immediately. He also offended the positioning of the UN-mission in the 
DRC (MONUC)."25  
The instability of the government and, first of all, the resistance of the rebel groups 
against governmental sovereignty, are not determined by political purposes that 
could be handled on the first level. What is of interest for the parties in the conflict is 
rather the local control of resources and commercial routes, which determine the 
military (and political) strategy of the actors. If these interests are more easily 
reached in a state of civil war, then every attempt for peace will be counteracted by a 
"voluntary defection."26 
Due to the fact that economical circumstances in wars transform the interests of 
actors, the problem can be that those circumstances are not approached with peace 
attempts referring to the principal origins of conflict. The growing importance of the 
“economy of war” has come to overshadow the principal objectives.27 
                                                          
23 www.Kongo-Kinshasa.de (downloaded on 2005/02/14), translation by C.S. 
24 Vgl. Aust, Björn: Feindliche Übernahmen. Ökonomische Interessen und “militärisches 
Unternehmertum” im Kongo, S. 145 
25 www.Kongo-Kinshasa.de (downloaded on 2005/02/14), translation by C.S.  
26 Vgl. Aust, Björn: Feindliche Übernahmen. Ökonomische Interessen und “militärisches 
Unternehmertum” im Kongo, S. 149 
27 Vgl. Aust, Björn: Feindliche Übernahmen. Ökonomische Interessen und “militärisches 
Unternehmertum” im Kongo, S. 149 and Vgl. Ballentine, Karen: Beyond Greed and Grievance: 
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Nevertheless, the rebel groups can not be seen in total confrontation to the 
government of Kabila. Kabila’s demission was utopian and in addition to that would 
also have provoked a very risky situation for the rebel groups themselves. The 
abrogation of all legal frameworks would have led to even more intense fighting 
among those groups and in consequence could threaten their assets. 
Which aspects would then be of interest to the rebel groups, permitting the 
government to broaden its win set? 
An autonomous status of the territories they already control in Eastern Congo (esp. 
Ituri and North- and Southkivu) would legitimate their predominance in these regions 
and would give them more economic and political liberties, especially in confrontation 
with the UN-troops. An integration of the most powerful rebel groups into the 
government would certainly lead to the manifestation or even extension of their 
influence.  
These were exactly the issues discussed in Sun City: the governmental spheres were 
divided among the different parties of the “Inner Congolese dialog”. The government 
now consists of President Joseph Kabila (son of Laurent-D.), his staff and four vice-
presidents representing different opposition and rebel groups. This structure, 
however, has not led to the expected unification between the different groups 
towards a coordinated coercion of power, but has actually deepened the division of 
the territory between the participants. So the official government still cannot claim 
control over the whole DRC, although the integration of the different regional 
opposition groups at the central level in Kinshasa decreased the informal space 
where many groups acted and therefore diminished the extent of violence in some 
areas. Nevertheless, there remain local fights at an alarming intensity. 
With that concept, SC02 made progress in the conflict and generated hope towards a 
real peace process. But again, its ratification on the internal level had to pass 
unexpected difficulties. Relatively new actor-alliances, such as the “alliance for the 
salvation of the inner Congolese dialog” and “the Congolese Opposition”, fought for 
an inclusion of all parties into a new-opened dialog. Besides those groups gaining 
importance, controversies among the already integrated groups continued.28 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed Conflict, in: Ballentine, Karen/ Sherman, Jake 
(Hrsg.): The Political Economy of Armed Conflict. Beyond Greed and Grievance 
28 Controversies between J. Kabila and Jean Pierre Bemba (MLC) about the formalisation of the new 
constellation: http://www.kongo-kinshasa.de/geschichte/geschichte5.php, downloaded on 2005/03/10. 
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This again shows the complexity of the conflict in the DRC and the importance of a 
cautious and detailed consideration of every local fight and economic circumstances. 
 
All in all we get to the conclusion, that the hypothesis seems true and the Two-Level-
Game-theory is useful to explain the ongoing of the Congo Conflict. Central for us 
was the concept of voluntary defection. Economic interests and the longing for 
autonomy of the decisive domestic veto-players have spoiled the agreement reached 
at the international level. In the Application of Putnam’s Two-Level-Games-Theory, it 
also becomes very apparent how the complex political and social constellation of the 
DRC is determined by the tremendous illegal exploitation of natural resources. Any 
attempts for a peaceful solution have to take this into account.  
One could also think about concentrating efforts on the reduction of the illegal 
exploitation of resources in the first place, which would be the only other possible 
solution of the situation. This would also require a more intense dealing with the 
illegal negotiations between the conflict groups and their partners in Rwanda, 
Uganda and in the "industrialized" countries. 
Confronted with the weakness of the Congolese state, one could, in this context, 
even doubt the possibility of the distinction between the two levels that are central for 
Putnam. However, for us it seemed reasonable to apply the Two Level Game as the 
Congolese state has reached internal and international recognition and is actually far 
from being totally deconstructed.29 
                                                          
29 Although one should not forget that its construction is mainly based on colonial history and 
international, especially UN, construction. 
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BY ONDŘEJ SPAČEK:  
COLUMBIA – AN INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The members of the Latin America 
Group decided to focus on the crisis in 
Colombia. We chose this conflict area 
in spite of the fact that the conflict we 
are witnessing here is not a purely 
international one. 
Colombia is located in the north-west 
of South America bordering Panama in 
the north, Ecuador and Peru in the 
south, Brazil in the south-east and 
Venezuela in the north-east and has a 
direct access to both the Pacific and 
the Atlantic Ocean. In large parts of the  
 
state area, its inhabitants face difficult living conditions, especially in the Andes 
mountain range in the western part of the country, which makes up about one third of 
the total area, but where about 80% of the inhabitants live. Poverty is also 
widespread in the swamps of Amazonas in the south-east covering another third of 
the country’s territory. The Andes are divided into three subsystems by the rivers of 
Magdalena and Cauca: the Cordillera Colombiana Occidental, Central and Oriental. 
Other important rivers are the Orinoco, constituting part of the border to Venezuela, 
and the Guaviare in the south at the entrance to the Amazonas region. 
Despite its extensive area (1 141 748 km2) and a very uneven population allocation, 
Colombia is a unitary state with 32 departments administered from the capital district 
of Bogotá, located in the mountain region in the centre of the country. However, large 
parts of the country are not controlled by the central government, but are occupied by 
paramilitary forces such as the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) or by 
THE CRISIS IN COLUMBIA
Source: Central Intelligence Agency,  
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/colombia_pol_2001.jpg 
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guerrilla groups, the biggest of them being the FARC (Fuerzas armadas 
revoucionarias de Colombia). 
Similarly to other countries in the region, national politics have been characterized by 
the conflict between liberals and conservatives right from the foundation of these 
parties in Colombia in 1849, including some armed encounters (e. g. the “The War of 
the Thousand Days” between 1899 and 1903, ending with Panama (“Nueva 
Granada”) being split up and therefore setting a definite end to what once used to be 
“Greater Colombia”). This bipolar structure persisted well into the 20th century 
reaching its climax in the conflict known as La Violencia between 1949 and 1958, 
leaving behind 250 - 300,000 dead. The two parties agreed to cooperate in a 
National Front where the presidency rotates and cabinet seats are divided equally. 
This agreement lasted formally until 1978 and practically until 1986, when new actors 
appeared on the Colombian political scene. 
Some analysts argue that it was explicitly the agreement between the two most 
powerful parties that contributed to the formation of armed opposition. In 1965, the 
ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) was founded, as the first guerrilla organization 
in Colombia. It was followed by the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia) in 1966, the military wing of the Communist Party of Colombia. Today, it 
has some 17,000 members, being the guerrilla movement with the biggest political 
influence. Finally, the M-19 (Movimiento 19 de Abril) was founded in 1971, the only 
guerrilla that managed to transform itself into an ordinary party by an agreement with 
the government in 1989. 
The guerrillas, politically far left, have to finance their activities. Drug trafficking and 
later kidnapping became the main source of income, although the majority of guerrilla 
leaders still deny receiving any financial resources through drug business. What 
started as political opposition has developed into a conflict touching the whole society 
and every sphere of life. 
Throughout the years, a number of attempts to stop the conflict, by some even called 
civil war, were undertaken. In 1982, for instance, President Belisario Betancúr 
Cuartos granted amnesty for the guerrilla combatants and freed political prisoners. 
Neither this, nor a Peace Commission in the 1990s was very successful. The 
successful institutionalisation of M-19 was only of temporary importance as the party 
didn’t manage to keep its active role in the political life and was last represented in 
the parliament in 1991. 
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A new series of peace talks started in 1999 after the Conservative Andrés Pastrana 
Arango had become president in the 1998 elections. The FARC was granted a save 
zone of the size of Switzerland. To negotiate a lasting peace agreement, Pastrana 
and the FARC leaders met in 1999. In October 2001, the representatives of the 
Colombian government and the FARC signed the San Francisco agreement. The 
parties committed themselves to negotiate a cease-fire, but the negotiations soon 
had to be interrupted due to the lack of compromises between Pastrana and the 
FARC and the constant violations of the treaty. Pastranas “peace experiment” ended 
with a military invasion of the formerly autonomous territory of the FARC and 
numerous casualties on both sides.  
From what has been said until now, it could be assumed that the Colombian conflict 
is rather an internal problem. Our working group, too, was tempted to concentrate on 
the conflict in Colombia itself. However, in the end, we managed to see the 
international side of the conflict. 
The US-American Administration and especially the US Drug Enforcement Agency 
turned out to be the strongest player on the international level (3rd level of analysis 
according to Waltz). The United States of America have been active in the region 
since the 1960s, when they started granting financial and military support to South 
American governments (and later also to rightist opposition groups, as for example in 
Chile in early 1970s). The US employed these means in order to limit the spread of 
what was perceived as a Cuban-inspired revolutionary threat and to support the 
“democratic candidates”, often ignoring the difference between a leftist democratic 
party and armed groups. 
In Colombia, US military advisors were quite active for the government of the country 
and inspired the formation of paramilitary forces of “self-defense”. In 1965, a 
presidential decree legalized the armament of civilians. Three years later, this decree 
was converted into permanent legislation and the law stayed in force until May 1989 
when it was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Later on, penalties for 
members and organizers of paramilitary groups were introduced in an additional 
decree. 
After the end of the Cold War, the priorities of the United States in South America, 
and especially in the Andes, changed and the main task became to eradicate the 
cultivation of coca, its processing into cocaine or heroin and the subsequent 
distribution on the US market. Colombia, today the world’s largest cocaine producer 
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and supplier of about 90% of the cocaine and up to 60% of the heroine distributed in 
the United States, was a clear target. 
Since the beginning of the 90s, huge sums of money have been invested and 
different approaches (aerial spraying of the coca fields, incorporation of US forces in 
the Colombian army, several talks of the Colombian government with the guerrilleros) 
have been applied to stop the drug trade and normalize the situation in the country. 
Until now, with very limited success. On the contrary, the US policies are provoking a 
lot of criticism especially concerning the militarization and criminalization of the 
Colombian civil society through US-politics and policies. 
 
 
CONSTRUCTIVISM – THE ALL EXPLAINING WONDER THEORY? 
 
In the session on realism, the group unanimously agreed that the (neo-)realist black-
box vision of the world does not give enough clues for explaining the Colombian 
conflict. As an alternative meta-theory, constructivist approaches are challenging 
realism. Constructivism does not solely open up the black box of the state. It also 
comes with a new perspective on what is happening in it. Constructivist authors 
concentrate on the social structures and on the way how they are being created by 
the actors and how they influence the actors in return. Not only material power of the 
actors is taken into account. The constructivist researchers concentrate also on the 
“discursive power”, power of knowledge, ideas, culture, ideologies and language. 
Constructivists analyze the power defining identity from which then the interests of 
actors are derived and which inspires the form of social structures. All in all, we were 
confronted with a completely different approach to international relations and were 
eager to see if it could deal more successfully with our conflict. 
In our view, it surely could do this in one aspect. It helps us to understand the 
relationship between Colombians and their own country, the neighboring states and 
the United States of America. From our point of view, this relationship is based on the 
idea of nationalism, which can be only taken into account when using a constructivist 
approach in the analysis. Let us return to the time of the liberation fights in the 19th 
century and have a more detailed look on this phenomenon. The struggle for 
independence was started by the Creole30 elites of the colonies and their motivation 
was clear: better career chances for themselves and their children, because under 
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the Spanish (or Portuguese) rule, the future prospects of Creoles were much more 
limited than those of peninsular Spaniards. Whereas the peninsulares could assume 
higher positions in the civil service both in Spain and all the colonies, the Creoles 
were limited to their own vice-royalty. The liberation of Latin America was elite-led 
and the pan-American coalition among the newly independent nations split up shortly 
after the victory was gained. 
Afterwards, each country went its own way in creating national heroes, symbols and 
legends in order to form a national identity. In Colombia, for example, the national 
hero of the first order became Simón Bolivar, the main protagonist of the liberation of 
the vice-royalty Gran Colombia. The strategy was successful – all the countries were 
able to construct relatively strong national identities and create patriotic feelings 
inside their citizens. This sometimes led to animosities and war, as for example 
between Argentine and Chile or Chile and Bolivia. However, the feeling of common 
past prevailed and it was reinforced by the image of a common enemy. First, it was 
Spain, but with its fading power, it was replaced by a new world power – the United 
States of America. 
 
The constructivism also makes it possible to have a closer look at the ideologies of 
the actors in the conflict. The degree of influence of the communist ideology on the 
guerrillas can be analyzed, but in our point of view is rather low. Also, the importance 
of ethnic origin for taking part in the conflict can be questioned in a constructivist 
approach. We believe that ethnic origin does play a role, as for example the majority 
of the members of the Colombian government is white. This aspect isn’t decisive, 
however. A constructivist research might even bring ideas how to solve the conflict, 
for example by reaching a “national reconciliation” dealing with the values and 
symbols that are common to all the actors of the conflict. 
 
An important disadvantage of the constructivist approach is the high proportion of 
field work that has to be done. This is always connected with high costs on time and 
other resources, in the case of Colombia additionally with substantial security risks. A 
simple analysis of the discourse using newspaper articles, speeches of the main 
personalities of the parties participating in the conflict or of the statements for the 
press would probably not offer a lot of new information about the present status of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
30 A Creole is a white person born in the New World. 
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the conflict. However, it could well be used for an analysis of the history of the 
conflict. We would be able to see its evolution and maybe even find some regularities 
in time, phases of lower and higher tension between the actors, and thus predict how 
the conflict could evolve in the future and say when chances to solve the conflict are 
highest. 
Constructivism might seem as an all-explaining wonder theory on the first sight, but 
its complexity and its need for lots of primary data makes it, at least in our eyes, 
applicable only to partial aspects of the conflict and not to the conflict as a whole. 
 
GLOBALIZATION 
 
 
The lecture on globalization proved to contain some very applicable aspects to our 
conflict. The “process generated by world wide interplay of capital flows and 
communications flows enabled by new technologies” can be noticed clearly not only 
in the big industrialized countries of the Northern hemisphere, but as well in a small 
South American country seemingly caught up only in its own national business. 
 
Primarily, the group discussed the direct influences of globalization on our region by 
looking at the relevant flows. Concerning the first two examples mentioned in the 
definition, capital and communications flows, we found out that big loans by the IMF 
and the World Bank constitute a great part of the international capital flowing into 
Colombia. Secondly, the money obtained from the international smuggling and 
trafficking of drugs and weapons makes up another substantial part of the Colombian 
shadow economy. Certainly these capital flows are a consequence of globally formed 
networks and interests. 
 
As another example, the human flow of migrants out of Colombia is quite astonishing: 
In 2002 alone, more than 360 000 Colombians applied for entry into the USA. The 
rising migration numbers are alertly observed by Amnesty International and other 
NGOs, which form another network trying to regulate communication flows out of the 
country. Together with the UN and representatives of the EU and US, they keenly 
observe the implementation of human rights in the country and put pressure on the 
government to apply democratic practices and reliable jurisdiction.  
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The other question we discussed focused on the existence of realistic exit options for 
the region and its actors to avoid being dragged into an unwanted process of 
globalization and form autonomous regions free from international pressure. To 
analyze this question we mainly focused on the economic side of globalization: A 
common South American market like Mercosur would enable the participating 
countries to protect themselves from the US domination of prices. Apart from that, we 
found inner-state peace and security to be a prerequisite for further sovereignty of the 
state. Only if Colombia manages to find a solution for the ongoing conflict, will the 
country have a right to refuse the international interference in their issues. In this 
situation direct international influence might be at least reduced, but the question 
remains, whether it could prevent the country from becoming subject to the various 
effects of globalization. Having thus argued, the group came up with the question of 
whether our conflict might somehow even be promoted by globalization and the 
international interest in the country, or whether these factors help to constrain the 
conflict. 
 
Finally, we spoke about the relations of international dependence and recognized our 
country as being clearly on the dependent side of globalization. As many of the Latin 
American states, Colombia exports mainly agricultural products like coffee or flowers 
and depends on the international trade system to obtain rather expensive imports in 
the field of technology, which are not being substituted by national industries. 
Furthermore, the lacking personal security, bad infrastructure and absence of skilled 
workers do not attract international investors and force many people out of the 
country, which eventually results in the high amount of migration mentioned above. 
Summing up the arguments, the group came to the conclusion that Colombia, like 
many other developing countries, does not shape the process of globalization, but 
instead is constantly shaped by it. While we detected capital flows, content flows and 
information flows into Colombia, the only constant flows out of the country 
unfortunately seemed to be drugs and migrants. Since the territory holds no 
important hubs or nodes for financial or informational conjunction, it cannot be 
expected to find a way out of this position in the near future, but will have to fiercely 
work on solving its inner conflict in order to profit from the process of globalization. 
 
